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GO WORLD

Spring 2000 NO. 88



KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

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The World of Chinese Go

by Guo Juan

Guo Juan studied to become a professional go player in China during the 1970s and 80s. She trained with many of the Chinese players who were to become the top names on the international go scene. Having lived in Holland now for more than ten years, she is the perfect person to convey the true flavor of the Chinese go world to Western players.

And this is what she does in her first book *The World of Chinese Go*, giving the reader an in-depth view of the Chinese go scene. Chapters are devoted to some of China's super-stars, such as Nie Weiping, Ma Xiaochun, Chen Zude, Chang Hao, and the great female player Rui Naiwei. Detailed analyses of their games are presented along with interesting insights into their characters and personalities. You will also get a glimpse of what life is like in a Chinese go school for aspiring professionals. The book also discusses the fierce competition to become a professional, and how those who fail to make the grade enter the amateur go ranks, raising the level of amateur tournaments to nearly top professional standards.

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Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

Go World News

December 1999–March 2000
by John Power



*Yet another victory for Lee Chang-ho (left) in an international tournament.
Cho Sonjin seems to be regretting the chances he missed in the third game.*

International

Samsung final: Lee wins three straight

The above heading has a double meaning: Lee Chang-ho not only won three straight games in the final of the 4th Samsung Cup World Open Baduk Championship, but also won his third Samsung cup in a row. Cho Sonjin, playing in his first international final, was no match for the world's undisputed number one. Without making any excuses for Cho, it does seem that Lee's wealth of experience at this level helped give him the edge. Cho's best performance was in the third game, in which he took the lead but missed his chances to wrap the game up. Cho was a good loser, admitting freely that Lee was the better player, but vowing to provide him with more opposition next time.

Lee has played in 12 finals in international tournaments (not counting the TV Asia Cup) and been victorious in 11 of them. That is truly a remarkable record.

The results:

Game 1 (23 Nov., 1999; Kwangju, Korea).

Lee (W) won by resignation.

Game 2 (6 Dec., Seoul). Lee (B) by resig.

Game 3 (7 Dec., Seoul). Lee (W) by resig.

4th LG Cup Final: China vs. Korea

The semifinals of this tournament were held in Seoul on 10 February. Three Koreans had won semifinal places to one Chinese, but Yu Bin 9-dan (white) of China managed to defeat Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan of Korea by resignation, to set up a China–Korea clash in the final. In the other semifinal, Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan (black) defeated his compatriot

Lee Chang-ho 9-dan by 5½ points.

This is Yu Bin's best effort yet in an international tournament, apart from winning the TV Asia Cup in 1997. Can he go on to breach the virtual Korean monopoly of the international titles?

1st Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup

This tournament is a reincarnation of the old Jinro Cup (also known as the SBS Jinro Cup), a team tournament among Korea, China and Japan that was discontinued after five terms. A new sponsor, the Korean noodles (ramen) manufacturer Nong Shim, has revived the tournament after a break of two years. The format is that of a rotating knock-out matching five-player teams from the top three go-playing countries. Each player keeps going until he is eliminated. Korea won all five of the Jinro Cups; in the 5th Cup, it won by the lopsided score of 9-1, as its second player, Seo Bong-soo, won nine games in a row. That still ranks as the best winning streak in an international tournament.

The Shanghai round

The first tournament under the new sponsor got off to a start on 16 December in Shanghai. One of the features of the tournament is that a team can field its players in any order and doesn't have to announce its choice until three hours before the game. In the past the usual practice has been to field the players in order of strength, keeping the number one player till last. With just five players, there might not seem to be much room for variation, but tactics did play a key role. The time allowance is one hour each, followed by one minute per move.

In the first game (the teams drew lots to see who would start off the tournament), Mok Jin-seuk 4-dan of Korea defeated Yamashita Keigo 6-dan of Japan. Aged 19, Mok was number four in the prize-money lists at the time in Korea. The following day Mok also beat the 17-year-old Qiu Jun 5-dan of China, thus getting Korea off to a good start. There was then a rest day and on the 19th Mok played the veteran Kudo Norio of Japan. The latter showed Korea that it wasn't going to have everything its own way by

eliminating Mok, but on the 20th he lost to Luo Xihe of China.

The Tokyo round

The second round of the tournament was played at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo in mid-January. In what was the fifth game of the tournament, played on 18 January, Kim Yong-sam 4-dan of Korea beat Luo Xihe of China.

The next day Japan decided to field its international ace, Yoda Norimoto. At first, Yoda lived up to expectations, defeating Kim on the 19th and Wang Lei 7-dan of China on the 21st.



Yoda plays the first move. The Japanese team was relying on him, but Korea's strategy in fielding Cho Hun-hyun paid off.

Now it was Korea's turn to play Yoda again. It had a formidable trio left in Lee Chang-ho, Yoo Chang-hyuk and Cho Hun-hyun, the world's top three in international go. However, Lee does quite badly against Yoda and Yoo only so-so, so Korea decided to field Cho, who had a good record against Yoda. This tactic paid off: playing white, Cho forced Yoda to resign after 256 moves. This game concluded the Tokyo round.

Korea is now in a very advantageous position: not only does it have three players left to Japan's two and China's two, it has also disposed of probably its most dangerous opponent in Yoda.

The tournament concluded with the

Seoul round, which began on 22 March. The remaining players on each team are:

Korea) Cho Hun-hyun, Lee Chang-ho, Yoo Chang-hyuk

China) Chang Hao, Ma Xiaochun

Japan) Yamada Kimio, Cho Sonjin

For the results in this round, see page 46.



Lee Chang-ho depicted as a go celestial (from Baduk magazine)

Lee wins Korea-China Tengen play-off

First of all, Tengen is the Japanese reading of a title known as Chunwon (actually the Bacchus Cup Chunwon) title in Korea and the Tianyuan title in China. Three years ago, Korean and China instituted a play-off like the Japan-China Tengen play-off.

The second point is that this news is a little late. The 1999 play-off was held in Shanghai on 18 August. Playing white, Lee Chang-ho defeated Chang Hao of China.

2nd Chunlan Cup: new Chinese stars make a splash

The first two rounds of the 2nd Chunlan (Spring Orchid) Cup, a Chinese-sponsored international tournament, were held in Beijing in late December. This time the home side did much better than last year, getting five players into the quarterfinals compared to just two last year. In particular, Chinese fans were probably encouraged by the success of two new stars, the 17-year-old Kong

Jie 5-dan (whom we introduced in *Go World* 85 in the article entitled 'A Fighting Art') and the 14-year-old Peng Quan 3-dan (a completely new name to us). Peng beat Jimmy Cha of the USA, always a tough opponent, and one of Korea's top players, Yoo Chang-hyuk. Kong disposed of Japan's Honinbo, Cho Sonjin. However, that was not all the good news for China. Ma Xiaochun scored one of his rare wins against Lee Chang-ho, while China's number one player, Chang Hao, also won his way through to the quarterfinals, as did Zhou Heyang.

As far as the Japanese were concerned, it was a case of *deja vu*. Just like last year, all their representatives were eliminated except for Yoda and O Rissei. The consistency of these two players in international go is almost the only thing that saves face for Japan.

The results in the opening rounds (note that eight players were seeded into the second round on the basis of results in the 1st Cup):

Round 1 (23 Dec.). Tono Hiroaki 9-dan (Japan) beat Mok Jin-seuk 4-dan (Korea), Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea) b. Ding Wei 7-dan (China), Zhou Junxun (Chou Chün-hsün) 9-dan (Chinese Taipei) b. Lin Zhaohua 5-dan (China), Peng Quan 3-dan (China) b. Jimmy Cha (USA), Kong Jie 5-dan (China) b. Cho Sonjin 9-dan (Japan), Morita Michihiro 9-dan (Japan) beat Shao Weigang 9-dan (China), Kim Sung-joon 6-dan b. Peng Jinghua (P'eng Ching-hua) 5-dan (Chinese Taipei)(Korea), Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China) b. Guo Juan (Europe).

Round 2 (25 Dec.). Zhou Heyang (China) b. Kim (Korea), Peng Quan (China) b. Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea), Ma Xiaochun (China) b. Lee Chang-ho (Korea), Yoda Norimoto (Japan) b. Seo Bong-soo (Korea), O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) b. Zhou (Chinese Taipei), Kong Jie (China) b. Choi Myung-Hun 6-dan (Korea), Chang Hao (China) beat Tono (Japan), Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea) b. Morita (Japan).

Quarterfinals pairings. Ma vs. Zhou, Cho Hun-hyun vs. Kong, O Rissei vs. Chang Hao, Yoda vs. Peng.

Kiriyama Cup Japan-China Play-off

Last year the Agon Buddhist sect took over sponsorship of the Acom Cup and renamed the tournament the Agon Kiriyama Cup (the head of the sect is named Kiriyama). At the same time, it founded a parallel tournament in China and also set up an annual play-off, known as the Kiriyama Cup Japan-China Play-off, between the winners of the respective tournaments.

As reported in our previous issue, Kobayashi Koichi won the Japanese tournament. The Chinese version was won by Ma Xiaochun on 16 October 1999.

The play-off (a single game rather than a best-of-three, as we wrote in GW87) between the two was held in Beijing on 12 January. Playing white, Kobayashi scored a comfortable win by resignation and so became the first unified champion.

1st Hung Chang Cup: another Rui triumph

The women's professional world championship, the Bohai Cup, was discontinued by its Korean sponsor after five terms, but last year a new sponsor, also Korean, stepped forward, and the tournament has been restarted as the Hung Chang Cup.

The first two rounds were held in Seoul in September last year, with 24 players from around the world participating.

The quarterfinals and semifinals were held in Korea on 11 and 13 January this year. In the semifinals, Rui defeated Okada Yumiko 4-dan of Japan and the 14-year-old Korean Cho Hye-yeon 1-dan defeated Hua Xueming 7-dan of China.

The best-of-three final was thus fought between Rui and the player nicknamed the 'female Lee Chang-ho', Cho Hye-yeon, who had just been promoted to 2-dan. It was played on 14, 16 and 18 February, and Rui won 2-1.

Rui won the Bohai Cup three times, so this is her fourth victory in six terms of the women's world championship.

13th Fujitsu Cup: Redmond wins a Japanese place

Michael Redmond has scored a coup by becoming the first Westerner to play for Japan in the Fujitsu Cup. Michael has repre-

sented North America five times, but he has been finding flying to America for the qualifying tournament too big a disruption to his schedule, so he decided to compete in the Japanese qualifying tournament instead. Gaining a place is a very difficult task, however, requiring a high-dan player (who starts out in the second qualifying round) to win seven or eight games in a row. Even Yoda Norimoto, Japan's top international performer, has won a place in only two Fujitsu Cups. However, Michael played brilliantly, putting together a string of seven wins, culminating in a victory over O Rissei in the deciding round. This success must rank as one of the major achievements of Michael's career. We hope he does just as well in the international tournament.

News from Japan



Cho (left) seems to be trying to work out what went wrong in the fourth game.

O Rissei defends Oza title

The 47th Oza title match was not a good series for students of the endgame — there was hardly any played. Instead, each game featured a massive centre fight in which O tried to kill a Cho group. If he failed, as in the first game, he lost, but if he succeeded, as in the next three games, there was no need to count. The result was one of the most spectacular series for some time. Unusually, Cho's celebrated *shinogi* skills let him down; for his part, O must consider the



O Rissei scores his first win (in Game Two) on his way to his Kisei triumph.

match good practice for the Kisei title match that began in January 2000.

This was O's first successful title defence and his third Oza title overall.

At the award ceremony, held on 24 January, Go Seigen said in a congratulatory speech that O was one of four players whom he expected to lead the go world in the 21st century, along with Lee Chang-ho, Cho Chikun, and Rui Naiwei.

The results:

Game 1 (25 Oct.). Cho (B) by 4½.
Game 2 (18 Nov.). O (B) by resig.
Game 3 (2 Dec.). O (W) by resig.
Game 4 (9 Dec.). O (B) by resig.

O Rissei takes Kisei title from Cho

The year 2000 is the 30th year since O Rissei came to Japan from Taiwan. He celebrated in the best way possible, by winning the 24th Kisei title. After 28 years as a professional, he thus reached the peak of the go world. It was his third challenge for a big-three title, and this time he reversed the score in his unsuccessful Honinbo and Meijin challenges (both in 1998), defeating Cho Chikun 4-2.

Cho started with a solid win in the first game, and it looked as if the story of the match might be a variation on the old theme: Cho is almost unbeatable in two-day games. However, he made a simple (by professional standards) life-and-death misreading in the second game, so O leveled the series. Then, in the fourth game, O staged a dramatic upset, killing a group in which Cho had made three ponnukis!

That win leveled the match, instead of making it 3-1 in Cho's favour, and it turned out to be decisive. O won the next two games and took the title. Commentators paid tribute to the great resourcefulness of O's play and his never-say-die fighting spirit. In an unfavourable position, he has the knack of preventing the opponent from landing a knock-out punch; he fights tenaciously and creates complications, thus conjuring up winning chances for himself. He seems to be especially strong in the late middle game.

O is the first player born in Taiwan to win a big-three title. He has shown himself to be a worthy successor to Rin Kaiho (a Taiwanese citizen, but born in Shanghai).

Cho now has just one title, the Meijin, left

of the Triple Crown he held for three years in a row. Moreover, his loss of the Kisei title after just four successive terms meant that he missed out on securing the title of Honorary Kisei.

Incidentally, an unusual feature of this year's title match was that White won five out of six games.

The results:

Game 1 (12, 13 Jan.). Cho (W) by 4½.

Game 2 (26, 27 Jan.). O (W) by resig.

Game 3 (2, 3 Feb.). Cho (W) by resig.

Game 4 (16, 17 Feb.). O (W) by resig.

Game 5 (23, 24 Feb.). O (B) by 5½.

Game 6 (8, 9 March). O (W) by resig.

Games One to Five are given in this issue.

European players clash on TV

NHK usually starts off the New Year with a special game on the first Sunday. This year it was an all-Western show, with Catalin Taranu 4-dan of Romania meeting Hans Pietsch 3-dan of Germany. Giving the commentary was Michael Redmond 8-dan of the USA.

In this encounter, Hans Pietsch took the honours. Playing black, he forced Catalin to resign after 221 moves. This is a good start to the year for Hans, who didn't have much to write home about last year, apart from winning promotion to 3-dan.

Cho Chikun wins Shusai Prize

The 37th Shusai Prize was awarded to Cho Chikun as the outstanding player of 1999. Although he lost the Honinbo title, Cho maintained his standing as the top player by defending the Kisei and Meijin titles. This is Cho's ninth Shusai Prize, which sets a new record, bettering Kobayashi Koichi's eight.

Shinkai wins 1st Strongest Woman Professional Title

Despite the economic slump in Japan, women's go is flourishing, and there are now five tournaments for women. The newest arrival is the Tokyo Precision [Instruments] Cup: The Strongest Woman Professional Title. In the final of the 1st cup, played on 12 November, Shinkai Hiroko 5-

dan defeated Yashiro Kumiko 3-dan. This is the first title for Shinkai, who is a disciple of the late Iwamoto Kaoru. Aged 41, she is uncomplimentarily classified as a 'veteran'. She became a professional in 1978 and was the first woman to win the *Kido* New Star Prize (in 1986).

Chinen wins Women's Kisei title

The first title match of the new millennium to be decided was the 3rd Women's Kisei title. This is a haya-go title (30 seconds per move plus ten minutes to be used when desired), and the first two terms were won by Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan.

Making her first challenge, Chinen Kaori, the Women's Honinbo, took the best-of-three title with straight wins. Kobayashi seems to do badly against Chinen, who rebuffed her challenge for the Women's Honinbo title last year 3-1.

The results:

Game 1 (21 Jan.). Chinen (B) by resig.

Game 2 (28 Jan.). Chinen (W) by ½.

O Rissei wins Kakusei title

On 21 February, sandwiched in between the fourth and fifth games of the Kisei title match, O Rissei played in the final of the 22nd Kakusei title. O was the winner of the 21st Kakusei and, playing white, he made it two in a row by defeating Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan by 5½ points. Hikosaka seems to have trouble with O — he also lost the Kisei playoff to him last year.

First prize is ¥5,100,000.

Cho wins NEC Cup

About the only thing that went right for Cho this winter was the final of the 19th NEC Cup, in which, playing black, he defeated Kato Masao by 5½ points. This is his third NEC Cup and his 60th title. In the associated tournament for young players, the 15th NEC Young Stars, Takao Shinji 6-dan (white) defeated Hane Naoki 7-dan by resignation.

Nakano challenges for 38th Judan title

The 38th Judan tournament. The star of the tournament was Yamashita Keigo 6-dan, a

55th Honinbo League (1999–2000) (as of 23 March 2000) Title-holder: Cho Sonjin

Player/Opponent	C.C	H.N.	O.R.	Y.K.	R.K.	O.H.	O.M.	R.S	won/lost
1. Cho Chikun	---	1	1	1	0	.	1	0	4-2
2. Hikosaka Naoto	0	---	1	0	1	0	.	1	3-3
3. O Rissei	0	0	---	1	.	0	0	0	1-5
4. Yamada Kimio	0	1	0	---	1	1	0	.	3-3
5. Rin Kaiho	1	0	.	0	---	1	0	0	2-4
5. Otake Hideo	.	1	1	0	0	---	1	0	3-3
5. O Meien	0	.	1	1	1	0	---	1	4-2
5. Ryu Shikun	1	0	1	.	1	1	0	---	4-2

21-year-old who is viewed as the hottest prospect of the younger generation. Yamashita won the winners' section of the tournament back in October, defeating Cho Chikun in the semifinal and Nakano Hiro-nari 9-dan in the final. He then had to wait three months to see who his opponent would be in the play-off to decide the challenger.

After switching to the losers' section, Nakano defeated Hane Naoki 7-dan, like himself a Nagoya player, then he also bested Cho Chikun in the final.

The unique feature of the Judan tournament is that everyone has to lose two games to be eliminated except one player: the winner of the winners' section. The majority of go fans were probably hoping to see Yamashita become the challenger, but in the play-off, held on 10 February, Nakano prevailed by half a point. Aged 30, Nakano will be making his first title challenge.

The title match. As we go to press, two games of the best-of-five title match have been played. On 9 March, Kobayashi Koichi (white) beat Nakano by 6½ points. On 23 March, Kobayashi won the second game by 13½ points.

Three players share Honinbo league lead

After leading all the way, Cho Chikun suffered his second loss in the 55th Honinbo league, at the hands of Ryu Shikun, in the sixth round, so the league has been thrown into confusion. Ryu and O Meien are now well in the running and a tie for first, necessitating a playoff, is quite possible. The final round will be played on 3 April.

If all three lose, Hikosaka could make the playoff instead of O Meien. O and Rin are already certain to lose their places, but any of the other players, except for Cho, could join them.

Yoshida/Tono win professional pair go

The final of the 6th Ricoh Cup Professional Pair Go Championship was held in Osaka on 8 January. The Kansai Ki-in pair of Yoshida Mika 6-dan and Tono Hiroaki 9-dan defeated the Nihon Ki-in pair of Hosaka Mayu 2-dan and Yamada Kimio 7-dan. This is the fifth time that the male player on the winning team has been a Kansai Ki-in player.

Aoki defends Women's Meijin title

In the 12th Women's Meijin best-of-three title match, Aoki Kikuyo 7-dan faced a tough challenger in Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan, but she was equal to the occasion. She defended her title with two straight wins, forcing Kobayashi to resign in both games, played on 1 and 8 March. This was Aoki's third Women's Meijin title and her sixth title overall. Kobayashi seems to be in a bit of a slump — this was her third successive defeat in title matches.

Gosei semifinal pairings

The semifinalists in the 25th Gosei tournament have been decided. In one semifinal, Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan will play Yamashita Keigo 6-dan; the other pits Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan against Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan. One of these four will challenge Kobayashi Koichi for the title.

25th Meijin League (1999–2000) (as of 23 March 2000) Title-holder: Cho Chikun

Player/Opponent	Y.N.	K.K.	R.S.	O.R.	K.M.	T.M.	O.M.	I.Y.	H.N.	won/lost
1. Yoda Norimoto	---	.	.	.	1	1	0	1	.	3-1
2. Kobayashi Koichi	.	---	.	.	1	1	0	.	1	3-1
3. Ryu Shikun	.	.	---	.	0	1	1	.	.	2-1
4. O Rissei	.	.	.	---	.	.	.	1	0	1-1
5. Kato Masao	0	0	1	.	---	.	.	.	.	1-2
6. Takemiya Masaki	0	0	0	.	.	---	0	.	.	0-4
7. O Meien	1	1	0	.	.	1	---	.	.	3-1
7. Imamura Yoshiaki	0	.	.	0	.	.	.	---	0	0-3
7. Hane Naoki	.	0	.	1	.	.	.	1	---	2-1

25th Meijin league

It's hard to say who has the Meijin lead, as some players have played more games than others. At this point, Yoda Norimoto, O Meien and Kobayashi Koichi are a little in front with scores of 3-1, but they are followed closely by Hane Naoki and Ryu Shikun on 2-1.

Yoda wins third NHK Cup in a row

Yoda Norimoto 9-dan has extended his unbeaten record in the NHK Cup to three years. In the final of the 47th Cup, televised on 26 March, Yoda (playing white) defeated Imamura Toshiya 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in by 7½ points. Playing in front of the nationwide TV audience, Yoda radiates an awesome confidence, so much so that it comes as a shock to realize that this is the only current domestic title he has won.

This was Yoda's fifth win in the NHK Cup, which brings him level with Otake Hideo. He is only the second player to win the NHK Cup three years in a row, following in the footsteps of Sakata Eio over four decades ago (1957–59). Yoda looks invincible in this tournament, so he may well break Sakata's record. However, he still has a long way to go to match Sakata's total of 11 NHK Cups.

Three times so far Yoda has gone on to win the TV Asia Cup, an international tournament among the *haya-go* (fast go) champions of China, Korea and Japan. If he wins again this year, that will also be three in a row.

This was also the third year in a row that

a Kansai Ki-in player had to be content with second place. Incidentally, to make the final Imamura had to overcome the father-daughter combination of Kobayashi Koichi and Izumi.

Sakata Eio retires

Sakata Eio, one of the greatest players of the 20th century, retired from active play on his 80th birthday, which fell on 15 February, thus putting an end to a career that lasted 65 years. Sakata dominated Japanese go in the 1960s, winning the Honinbo title seven years in a row and becoming the first tournament Meijin-Honinbo in 1963. He still holds the record for most titles won (64).



Sakata Eio lets the curtain fall on a 65-year career.



Kajiwaru Takeo

Kajiwaru announces his retirement

On 17 March, Kajiwaru Takeo 9-dan announced his intention to retire, on the grounds of age, as of 31 March. Kajiwaru has been in poor health since the mid-90s and has not played any tournament games since 1994.

Although he never won a title, Kajiwaru has been one of the leading players of the postwar period; he has been very influential, both as a theorist and as a teacher (he taught the young Kitani school players like Ishida, Kato, Takemiya, Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Koichi when Kitani fell ill in his later years). As a theorist, he paid great attention to the right direction of play in the fuseki and he also invented many josekis, including some spectacularly sacrificial lines. Kajiwaru had profound insight into local tactics and tried to make all his stones work with peak efficiency. He also had a gift for coining new terms, often by combining and abbreviating existing terms, and many of his neologisms have become widespread. Some examples are *owa* (from *owari*), meaning that a game is as good as over (even if it's still in the opening), *muzu* (from *muzukashii*, meaning 'difficult'), and *tsuki-su* (meaning 'a great difference', a contraction of the proverbial expression *tsuki to suppon hodo chigau*, meaning 'as different from each other as the moon and a snapping turtle').

Kajiwaru was born on 25 February 1923 in Niigata Prefecture. A disciple of Sekiyama Riichi, he became 1-dan in 1937 and 9-dan in 1965. He was one of the leading young players of the immediate postwar period and was known as one of 'the three crows' of the postwar generation (the others were Fujisawa Shuko and Yamabe Toshiro; 'three crows' is a term meaning the leading trio).

Altogether, Kajiwaru played in seven Meijin leagues and three Honinbo leagues. He challenged Sakata unsuccessfully for the Oza title in 1964 and also reached the play-off of the 1971 Pro Best Ten title. His career results were 599 wins to 464 losses and 11 jigos.

Shuko: *persona non grata* at the Nihon Ki-in

Shuko expelled from Nihon Ki-in

The Nihon Ki-in expelled Fujisawa Shuko, Honorary Kisei, on 14 December 1999. The circumstances are as follows.

On 29 November, Fujisawa Shuko held a press conference to announce that he was going to issue amateur dan diplomas under the name of the Shuko School (Shuko Juku). His reason was that the fees for Nihon Ki-in diplomas were too high and were alienating fans.

Shuko proposed to charge ¥15,000 for a shodan diploma, with the fee going up ¥5,000 per dan up to 6-dan, which would be ¥40,000. That would certainly be much cheaper than the Nihon Ki-in's fees, which

start at ¥31,500 for shodan and reach ¥210,000 for 6-dan.

The Nihon Ki-in objected strongly and asked Shuko to reconsider. Diploma fees are one of the most important sources of income for the Nihon Ki-in, and it's well understood that the fee is really in large part a donation for the promotion of go. From the Nihon Ki-in's point of view, the issue of diploma fees is one that affects its very survival.

When Shuko refused to retract, the Ki-in 'expelled' him. Actually, Shuko had submitted his resignation on 22 November, but the Nihon Ki-in just took 'temporary custody' of this while it tried to get him to change his mind. (The advantage of this procedure is that you retain the right to expel the offender.)

Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the issue, it's a pity that Shuko's lifelong connection with the Nihon Ki-in should end on a sour note.

There has been no word on how sales of his diplomas have been going.



Yamabe Toshiro (1926–2000)

Death of Yamabe Toshiro

Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan died of stomach cancer on 5 February at the age of 73. Nicknamed 'Kaleidoscopic Yamabe' for his imaginative go, Yamabe was one of the leading players of the postwar decades. He was born in Tokyo on 31 July 1926. He be-

came 1-dan in 1941 and 9-dan in 1963. After the war, he was considered one of the top three young players, along with Fujisawa Shuko and Kajiwara Takeo. In his youth his flair also earned him the nickname 'Genius Yamabe'. However, although the nickname was well deserved, he failed to live up to his potential. Perhaps the reason was an inability to play his best under pressure in important games.

Yamabe played in the Meijin league eight times and the Honinbo league nine times. His biggest success was winning the 20th Honinbo league in 1965, but he lost the title match 0–4 to Sakata. He also challenged unsuccessfully for the 6th Tengen title and for two Nihon Ki-in Championships. He was perhaps the strongest player to fail to win a title.

Death of Hisai Keishi 9-dan

Hisai Keishi, aged 79, died of pneumonia on 8 February 2000. He was born in Osaka on 13 May 1920 and became a disciple of Segoe Kensaku. He made shodan in 1937 and reached 9-dan in 1978. He played in two Honinbo and two Meijin leagues. Until his retirement in May 1985, he was one of the leading players of the Osaka branch of the Nihon Ki-in.

Correction

In the caption to the photo on page 5 of GW87, we wrote that Kobayashi Koichi was wearing contact lenses, but we had been misinformed. Actually he had a laser operation that improved his sight.

News from Korea

Rui Naiwei has spectacular first year, wins a top Korean title

Rui Naiwei 9-dan, the world's top woman player, has had a spectacular first year in Korea. First of all, she had the best winning percentage (85%, 34 wins, 6 losses) for 1999. Secondly, she became the challenger for the 43rd Kukso title, defeating none other than Lee Chang-ho in the playoff (held on 4 January 2000) to decide the challenger. Then, in the best-of-three final she

defeated Cho Hun-hyun 2-1 to take the title. She is the first woman player in the history of go to win a professional title open to all members of the go association concerned. Not surprisingly, she has attracted a lot of attention in the Korean media, whose coverage has been very favourable. The Korean go newspaper *Weekly Baduk* 361 has run through a variety of nicknames for her: 'Amazon' when she got the top winning percentage; 'devil woman' when she beat Lee; 'the iron woman' when she took the Kuksu title.

The original motive for inviting her to become a guest member of the Korean Go Association was to stimulate the development of women's go, but she is having an even more far-reaching impact than expected. The morning after Rui won the title, she received a telegram of congratulations from the president of Korea, Kim Dae-jung.

Incidentally, she also defeated Yoo Chang-hyuk in a preliminary game, so to win the Kuksu title she bested the world's top three players.

The third game of the title match was relayed live on the Internet, so presumably it was followed by go fans all round the world.

Results of the title match:

Game 1 (17 Jan.). Cho (B) by resig.

Game 2 (31 Jan.). Rui (B) by resig.

Game 3 (21 Feb.). Rui (B) by resig.

The first game lasted 163 moves, the second 155, and the third 199, which seems to indicate that it was quite a fiery match.

The playoff against Lee Chang-ho is given on page 15. Games from the title match will be featured in our next issue.



Seo Bong-soo (from Baduk)

Seo's comeback

The indomitable Seo Bong-soo has made a comeback after seven years without a title. In the LG Oil Corporation Cup (formerly the Tekron Cup), he defeated Yoo Chang-hyuk

3-2. The final game was played in Seoul on 5 November.

Cho wins 18th KBS King of Baduk

In the best-of-three KBS King of Baduk title match, Cho Hun-hyun defeated Lee



Cho Hun-hyun (from Baduk)

Chang-ho 2-0 to take this title for the 11th time. The deciding game was played on 9 November.

Yoo defends the Pae-Dal King title

In the 7th Pae-Dal King title, Yoo Chang-hyuk rebuffed the challenge of Cho Hun-hyun with straight wins to keep his title. The third game was played on 29 November.

Lee defends Chunwon title

In the 4th Bacchus Cup Chunwon (= Tengen) best-of-five match (the successor to the Bacchus) title, Lee Chang-ho defeated the challenger, Seo Bong-soo, 3-0 to continue his monopoly of this title. The third game was played on 20 November.

Lee rebuffs Choi's challenge in Kisung title match

The challenger for the 11th Kisung (= Kisei), which has recently been monopolized by Lee Chang-ho, was the 36-year-old Choi Kyu-byung 9-dan, who was number ten in the Korean rankings last year. Choi had lost 16 games in row to Lee, but he made a good start in the best-of-three (formerly best-of-five) title match, forcing Lee to resign after just 93 moves in the first game (played on 10 January). However, Lee reasserted his dominance over Choi, winning the second (26 January) and third (14 February) games to defend his title. He has now held the Kisung title for eight years in a row.

Baduk magazine's poll on century's top ten

At the end of last year, *Baduk* (Go) magazine conducted a poll among go

journalists on 'giants of go in the 20th century'. There were one or two surprises in the results, given below (unfortunately, we don't know the order, if there was one).

Lee Chang-ho
Cho Hun-hyun
Cho Nam-chul
Cho Chikun
Shusai Meijin
Kitani Minoru
Takemiya Masaki
Go Seigen
Nie Weiping
Ing Chang-ki

Cho Nam-chul was presumably chosen for his achievements as the founding father of professional go in Korea. Ing Chang-ki was presumably honoured as international go's greatest patron. The only serious argument a Japanese go fan could have with the selection is the omission of Sakata Eio, a player who in his prime was second to none. However, it's interesting to see the high regard in which Shusai, who died nearly 60 years ago, is held.

Park wins Women's Myung-in

The Women's Myung-in (= Meijin) is a new tournament started in March 1999. The winner of the eight million won first prize was Park Ji-un 2-dan (17 years old). She beat Lee Young-shin 2-dan (aged 22) 2-1 in the final (games played on 29 January and 2 and 11 February).

Choi wins 1st Myak-shing Cup

The Myak-Shing Cup: The Strongest 9-dan title is a new tournament just started this year, with 18 9-dans competing. The winner was Cho Kyu-byung, who beat Yoo Chang-hyuk 2-1 in the final (the deciding game was played on 6 March).

News from China

Ma wins 11th Mingren title in a row

The 12th Mingren (= Meijin) title match was held in November in Guangdong province. Ma Xiaochun scored three straight

wins against the challenger, Chang Hao 9-dan, and so won this title for the 11th successive year.

Ma wins Agon Kiriya Cup

This is a new tournament founded in parallel with the Japanese tournament of the same name. In the final, played on 16 October 1999, Ma Xiaochun beat Zhou Heyang by 4½ points.

Shao wins NEC Cup

In the final round of the 5th NEC Cup, held in Beijing on 22 January, Shao Weigang 9-dan defeated Chang Hao 9-dan. This is Shao's second NEC Cup — he first won it in 1997.

In the associated Rising Starts tournament final, played on the same day, Xu Shuyang 5-dan defeated Ding Wei 7-dan.

14-year-old pro wins amateur championship

The 2000 all-China amateur championship was held in Tianjin (formerly known as Tientsin) from 4-13 January with 74 players from 26 provinces and cities participating. This year there was a major change in the rules, permitting professional 1-dans aged 14 or younger to compete. This caused quite a bit of controversy.

Sure enough, the winner was a 14-year-old pro, Zhou Zhenyu of Nanjing, followed by the 11-year-old Meng Lei of Shenyang. The top amateur was Liu Jun of Shanghai, but actually Liu is a former professional who quit because of health problems. He subsequently won the World Amateur Go Championship twice and the Champion of Champions tournament held to commemorate the 20th WAGC in 1998.

Zhou will be the Chinese representative in the 22nd WAGC, which is bad news for other players who might have fancied their chances this year.

Ma to challenge for Lebaishi Cup

The playoff to decide the challenger for the 3rd Lebaishi (= Mr. Roberts, the name of a milk company) Cup was held in Beijing on 28 December last year. Ma, the winner of the winners's section, defeated the winner of the

losers' section, Yu Bin by 5½ points, playing black. He is now challenging the title holder, Chang Hao, in a best-of-seven match that started in mid-February.

Results to date;

Game 1 (14 Feb.). Chang (B) by resig.

Game 2 (16 Feb.). Ma (B) by 4½.

Game 3 (18 Feb.). Chang (B) by resig.

Chang Hao wins fourth Tianyuan in a row

Chang Hao 9-dan rebuffed the challenge of Dong Yan 6-dan for Tianyuan (= Tengen) 3-1 to win this title for the fourth year in a row.

The results:

Game 1 (25 Feb.). Chang (W) by resig.

Game 2 (27 Feb.). Dong (W) by 1½.

Game 3 (29 Feb.). Chang (W) by ½.

Game 4 (2 march). Chang (B) by 3½.

Liu wins King of the New Starts

Liu Shizhen 5-dan won this best-of-three title with straight wins against Ding Wei 7-dan. The games were played on 20 (Liu won by resignation with white) and 21 (Liu won by 3½ points) February.

1999 in statistics

For the statistical-minded, here is a round-up of the 1999 tournament year in statistics, preceded by a listing of the *Kido Prizes*. For Japan, the statistics represent a selection from a vast amount of data; for China and Korea, they represent all the data we could get our hands on.

Japan

33rd Kido Prizes

Although the magazine *Kido* is defunct, the Kido Prizes have been continued by its successor, *Monthly Go World*. The prizes for 1999 were awarded as follows:

1. Most Outstanding Player: Cho Chikun
(Cho's 9th award sets a new record, ahead of Kobayashi Koichi's eight).
2. Most wins: Takao Shinji 6-dan (61)
3. Best winning percentage: Yamashita

Keigo 6-dan (82.1%).

4. Most successive wins: Hane Naoki 7-dan (19)
5. Most games played: Takao (75)
6. Outstanding players: Cho Sonjin, Kobayashi Koichi
7. International: Yoda Norimoto
8. Top woman player: Chinen Kaori
9. New star: Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan

Most wins (5-dan and up)

1. Takao Shinji 6-dan: 61-14 (61 is a new record)
2. Yamashita Keigo 6-dan: 55-12, Hane Naoki 7-dan: 55-18
4. Cho U 6-dan: 51-13
5. Kim Shujun 5-dan: 46-12
6. Kono Rin 5-dan: 45-12, Akiyama Jiro 7-dan: 45-16
8. Nakamura Shinya 7-dan: 43-16
9. Mizogami Tomochika 6-dan: 40-9, Kobayashi Koichi: 40-14, Ryu Shikun: 40-18

Takao's total of 61 wins is a new record, beating Yamashita Keigo's short-lived record of 60 set the previous year. Takao's final win was scored against Mizogami and it cost the latter first place in the best-winning-percentage category.

Turning from number to quality of wins, Cho Chikun's record was 31-21. The new Honinbo, Cho Sonjin, scored 20-14. Michael Redmond 8-dan scored 24-15 (equal 40th). In the under-5-dan group, Catalin Taranu 4-dan took 8th place with 23-13. Kobayashi Izumi was the top woman player with 38-22 (actually the best overall record for low-dan players).

Best winning percentage (players 5-dan and up with 25+ wins)

1. Yamashita Keigo 6-dan: 82%
2. Mizogami Tomochika 6-dan: 81.6%
3. Takao Shinji 6-dan: 81.3%
4. Cho U 6-dan: 76.7%
5. Kim Shujun 5-dan: 79.3%
6. Kono Rin 5-dan: 78.9%
7. Goto Shungo 9-dan: 78.1% (25-7)
8. Awaji Shuzo 9-dan: 78% (32-9)
9. Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan: 76.7% (33-10)
10. Kataoka Satoshi: 9-dan 75.6% (31-10)

Continued on page 53

The 43rd Kuksu Tournament

Final Game to Determine the Challenger

For the last 10 years Rui Naiwei has been wandering in the go wilderness, looking for a venue in which to unleash her formidable go talent. She is clearly the world's strongest female player, but there are some who believe that she ranks right up there with the top male players in the world. She has never had the opportunity to prove this by consistently competing in a large number of tournaments against top competition.

Finally, last April, she and her husband, Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan, were invited to become guest members in the Korean Go Association and to play in their tournaments. At the end of 1999, she had the best winning percentage (84.62%) there (Lee Chang-ho was second with 83.61%). But, most importantly, she reached the final round of the tournament to decide the challenger to the Kuksu title holder Cho Hun-hyun. Her opponent in that round was none other than the 'invincible' Lee Chang-ho. To almost everyone's astonishment, she not only beat Lee, but she also went on to beat Cho 2-1 in the best-of-three title match.

By beating two of the strongest players in world (and the two strongest in Korea), Rui has proven that she is among the world's top players. No doubt we can expect to see more triumphs from her in the future.

In this issue, we are presenting her game against Lee Chang-ho. A full report on her win over Cho Hun-hyun in the title match will appear in our next issue.

White: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Black: Rui Naiwei 9-dan

Played on January 4, 2000.

Commentary by Rui Naiwei from an interview with Ch'oi Chin-yong.

Figure 1 (1-67)

Q: This was your third encounter with Lee 9-dan . . .

Rui: We played in the 2nd and 3rd Ing Cups with one win each, but this was the first time we met in a national tournament.

Q: How did you feel drawing black, which is regarded as favourable in one-game matches?

Rui: In recent games I had white fairly often without thinking much about it. It was nice to have black.

Q: Is the komi a problem?

Rui: A 5.5-point komi is clearly too small. The recent shift towards 6.5 points in many Korean tournaments is correct.

Q: This game was broadcast live on the Korean Go Association homepage (www.baduk.or.kr). Black 67 surprised many observers. There were shouts of, 'Is it an over-play?', 'Is something wrong here?' It must have been a special sensation to let off such a power-move against Lee Chang-ho.





Figure 1 (1-67)

Rui: Instead of calling 67 a good move, I'd rather say that White 66 was strange. Not exchanging 62 for 63 and directly playing as in *Dia. 1* would have been better. Next, just jumping to 5 would complete White's defense. Later, White has A to capture Black 2 in sente, which erases White's weakness at B, making it difficult for Black to reduce White's territory on the upper side.

Q: Were those your thoughts during the game?

Rui: Well, no. Later, it was pointed out by Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan. Playing White 66 was

like complying with Black's wishes. Even after exchanging 62 for 63, White should play White 1 of *Dia. 1*. That wouldn't be bad for White.



Dia. 1


Q: Going back in the game a bit, a large-scale joseki was played in the upper left. Do you like that type of joseki?

Rui: I've never played this joseki with Black. Moreover, since the board becomes narrow with such josekis, I actually dislike them.

Q: Then why did you play it this time?

Rui: First I thought of playing Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. But out of dislike for White's forcing moves of A and B later, I immediately changed my mind. My heart was attracted by Black 15.

Q: You thought almost 30 minutes out of a total of 3 hours about Black 59. Why?



Dia. 2

Rui: Because in spite of the fact that I had been allowed to play as I wanted up to Black 57, when White played 58, I somehow felt that the game was disadvantageous for me. After the game Cho 9-dan had to recommend the same *Dia. 2* before I could accept that my first instinct was indeed better and I should have followed *Dia. 2*. With 5, Black secures a big corner, and the marked white stone looks dubious.

This game made me admire Lee's strong

point: allowing his opponents to play the way they want, yet not falling behind.





Figure 2 (68-93)

Figure 2 (68-93)

Q: Somehow the game became a fight on all frontiers. With 88, White went all out to capture the black group at the top and, with the moves up to 93, Black encircled the white stones in the center. Was there no other way but to fight like this?

Rui: It only becomes clear in the continuation, but White 88 was unreasonable. Trying to set up a capturing race like this was a radical approach, not typical of Lee Chang-ho. Had he played as in *Dia. 3*, White would have had the better position.

Q: Wouldn't the white group be endangered by Black 2?



Dia. 3

Rui: If Black wanted to capture it after White 3 in *Dia. 3*, Black would have to play A, followed by White B–Black 5–White C, resulting in a ko, where Black takes first at D. But Black's group at the top depends on the ko as well, so the burden is also heavy on Black. Moreover, White has numerous ko threats starting with E, so Black can't play the ko. Therefore, Black should go for life with the hane at 4, although letting White play 7 hurts.

Q: Isn't Black 8 big?

Rui: Of course, but White has become very strong in the center, so he can continue with 9 and 11, getting sufficient compensation for the damage suffered at the top. (Right after the game Lee disagreed. His comment on *Dia. 3*: 'White is short on territory.')

Q: Again, stepping back a little, with the 68–69 exchange, both of you seemed to show fighting spirit, trying to have your own ways.

Rui: Yes. If White didn't want to let Black push through with 69, he had to block at 69 himself, but Black just connects with 70 and the white shape is full of defects. White had to play 68.

Q: I'm even more curious as to why White didn't take the ponnuki by playing at 83 instead of 70, considering the proverb 'a ponnuki is worth 30 points.'

Rui: That would surely have been an exciting ponnuki. On the other hand, suffering Black 73 would give the right side back to Black, which is too much secure profit.

Q: I see. Most professionals following the game felt that Black had a favourable fight with 93. Weren't you excited?

Rui: I felt rather uneasy. Lee is such a strong player that I was scared he'd come up with some brilliant move, so deep in my heart I was hoping he would play as in *Dia. 3*, despite the fact that it would be a bit disadvantageous for me.

Q: You feel Lee is so strong?

Rui: Of course. Playing this game, I had a vague feeling of being pushed around.

Figure 3 (94–116)

Q: It's time to look at the outcome of the capturing race. When White cut with 100, Black immediately took liberties with 101 and 103. Did that mean you thought you had captured White?




Figure 3 (94–116)

Rui: It was a hallucination. If I had lost this game, Black 101 and 103 would have been the losing moves.

After being shut in with 93, Lee evaluated the capturing race with the upper right black group as unfavourable (after the exchanges of White A for Black B and White C for Black D, Black has nine liberties), so he played the probe of White 94. After thinking for a long time, I played 95. Slacking off here, allowing White to increase his liberties to over nine, would be the end, of course.

Q: Well, you said Black 101 and 103 could have lost the game. It seems to be time to explain that in detail. I'm really curious.

Rui: First you'd have to understand the close relation between this fight and the upper left corner.


Q: Ah, that's why White played 104 and 106 instead of continuing the capturing race. But what if Black used 105 or 107 to win the right side fight?

Rui: If White captured the four black stones (next to 104), the whole upper left would turn from Black's territory to White's. The black territory in the lower right is as big as the emperor's palace, but White's surpasses even that. In other words, Black cannot give up the upper left.

Q: That's a heavy burden on Black.


Rui: Therefore, I should have extended to 1 in *Dia. 4*, instead of 101 and 103, reducing the possibility of confusion. Now White could hit

and stomp as he wants, there's no way to get a combined attack on the marked stones, even with White A being sente. The only problem might be White B.



Dia. 4

Q: This is like watching a 3-dimensional war. Wouldn't it be troublesome if White broke into the lower side?



Dia. 5

10: at the marked white stone

12: at the marked black stone

Rui: Dia. 5 shows the solution. It looks as if White could increase his liberties with 2 and 4, but, as Black's shape is solid, White still has only six liberties after Black 13. Not much of a change.


Q: Now please explain why Black 101 and 103 could have become the losing moves! You won't digress again, will you?

Rui: (laughing) You certainly are

persistant. Anyway, look at Dia. 6. It shows that White 108 failed to take advantage of Black's mistake. White 1 and 3 in Dia. 6 get one more liberty. If he then continues as in the game by starting a capturing race with the four marked stones with 5, White would have won.

Q: Only one move is different? What's impressive about that?

Rui: As it turned out in the game, Black won with exactly that one-move difference.



Dia. 6

Q: Okay, you've stressed the one-move difference often enough, now please explain it in detail!

Rui: In Dia. 6, Black has two possible continuations after White 5: Black 6 and Black A. Black A is answered with White B, resulting in the same sequence as in the game, so White wins the capturing race, as White gained a liberty with 1 and 3.

Next, what about Black 6 in Dia. 6? That wouldn't work either. After White A and C, White has D and E as absolute sente in reserve, so Black has no way of escaping.

Q: That leads us back to the game sequence. Was it a one-way street?

Figure 3 (114-131)

Rui: No. Actually White 114 was the final losing move. The white group in the lower right center has only four liberties, so the desire to take the black group's liberties immediately is natural. Yet, some cooler reading was needed.

Q: Please explain?





Figure 3 (114-131)

Rui: As was discovered in the Chung-am study circle (a study group of many young Korean professionals, including Lee Chang-ho) White 1 of *Dia. 7* still would have done the job. Since Black cannot gain any liberties, White wins the capturing race.




Dia. 7


Q: It looks as if Black increases his liberties with 2 to 6.

Rui: As I said before, Black cannot give up the upper right corner, so White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* are absolute sente. After that, White 5 is important. Black's liberties remain unchanged at three.

Q: How about keeping the ataris of 1 and 3 in reserve until absolutely necessary? Isn't that a more high-level way of playing?



Dia. 8
4: at the marked stone



Dia. 9

Rui: Surely, if those moves were always absolute sente, but, if we proceed as far as in *Dia. 9*, Black might not answer White 7, but make a ponnuki with 8 instead. This is different from the exchange explained above, as Black could play any move around B in sente, forcing White to connect with A, thus laying waste to the whole upper side. And if the circled black stones could be saved with a move like Black 10, Black would win.

Q: Huh . . . complicated!

Rui: But we've almost reached the end now.

Figure 4 (132-147)

Q: White resigned at 147. Why didn't he continue, playing at A?




Figure 4 (132-147)

Rui: That would be followed by *Dia. 10*. After 2 to 9 a ko will result. Lee didn't resign because he overlooked that, he resigned because he correctly calculated that he falls short by one ko threat. I was surprised here, too.

Q: Why?

Rui: Winning by just one ko threat surprised me. I'm quite ashamed that, despite not being in overtime yet, I mistakenly thought myself well ahead in ko threats. On the other hand, Lee 9-dan was fully aware of the situation. For reference, see the moves


from 10 to 24 in *Dia. 10*. With the three internal ko threats of 10, 16, and 22, Black wins over White's two ko threats at 13 and 19.

Q: Let me congratulate you on becoming the challenger for the Kuksu title and overcoming such strong opposition in the person of Lee Chang-ho. You will now face Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan. What's your expectation for that match?

Rui: I'll just try to play my best.

White resigns after Black 147.

From *Baduk*, February 2000. Translated by Franz-Josef Dickhut.



Dia. 10

12, 18, 24: at 2; 15, 21: at 9

The 24th Kisei Title Match

As reported in the news section (page 6), O Rissei defeated Cho Chikun to win the Kisei title. In this issue we will present commentaries on the first five games. Game Six will be featured in the next issue of *Go World*.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Black: O Rissei, Oza

Played on January 12 & 13, 2000

Commentary by Cho Sonjin Honinbo

Figure 1 (1-21). A strange sequence

If you did not immediately see some of the moves in this figure, don't worry. It ended in a common position, but the position was reached in a rather strange way.





Figure 1 (1-21)




Cho Chikun seems to exude a quiet confidence after defeating O Rissei in the first game of the Kisei title match.

Cho spent 25 minutes on White 12. In a recent book, he commented that these protracted spells of cogitation are not as significant as everybody imagines; he is just mulling things over. Often he is mulling over a move like this one, that most people would make without hesitation. This is his rhythm of play, and the time is not necessarily wasted, but don't ask me what he was thinking about here.



Dia. 1

Black had to reply at 13. Black A may be a joseki move, but it would be out of balance with Black 5 and 7 in the lower left, creating a flat position. Black 1 in *Dia. 1* would leave a weakness at 'a', so if White invaded at 'b', Black would have to defend at 'c'.



Dia. 2

The strange sequence started with Black 15, and the farther it went, the stranger it got. I won't even try to comment on it, except to say that Black usually plays 15 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, letting White develop the upper side with 2 and 4, then plays 5 to expand the bottom while pressuring White on the right. Perhaps O rejected this sequence because he wanted to take it easy in the first game.





Figure 2 (22-38)

Figure 2 (22-38). Cho's experiment

Cho must have experimented with White 22 because this was the first game of the series. If it had been the seventh game, even Cho would probably have defended the corner at 25.


White 24 brought the game to its first turning point, and gave Black three choices. One was to wedge in at A, followed perhaps by White 26, then the lettered sequence from Black B to White I, a fair enough result.



Dia. 3

Another choice was the hane at Black 1 in Dia. 3, probably leading to the even exchange through White 8. Finally there was the choice Black made at 25, which got bad reviews. My first impression of this move was also negative, because White 26 makes such good shape, but now I think differently, because the marked black stone reduces the value of White's good shape by half. Black chose 25 in just two minutes, after White had spent an

enormous amount of time on 24. There may have been an element of gamesmanship in this.



Dia. 4

What hurt was to let White play 36 in sente. Black could have played 35 at 1 in Dia. 4. Apparently O didn't want to have White play 6, but Black 7 would look after the black group on the left. The general feeling was that the 36-37 exchange put White slightly ahead.





Figure 3 (39-73)

Figure 3 (39-73). Cho builds a framework.

Note Black 39. I hope no one would be so timid as to play this move at A or B, but Black 39 does leave potential trouble in the corner, so Black reinforced at 41. Black 41 was correct in this position, in which fighting can be pre-


dicted in the center. Black 1 in *Dia. 5* would let White push at 2 in sente.



Dia. 5

Cho committed himself to a framework strategy by playing White 42. Black patched up his group with 43 and 45, and waited to see what would come next. He had four corners, but they were all small. If the black group on the left were to be severely attacked, Black would be on the road to defeat.

White 48 was a Takemiya-style move. The center was swelling out nicely, and was further strengthened by White's connection at 52.



Dia. 6

White 54 was ideal, but O countered beautifully from Black 55 to 61, taking more profit in the bottom left corner and stealing eyes from the white group. White had to play 62. If he played 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black would play 2 and 4 and White's position would collapse. Black now had to reduce White's framework at 67,

letting himself be sealed in at the bottom by White 68.





Figure 4 (74-109)


Figure 4 (74-109). A brilliant probe

White 74 was a beautiful example of the difficult art of preparing an attack by feinting in the opposite direction. Besides threatening the corner territory, 74 also prepared to cut off the marked black stone. Black naturally replied at 75, to keep White from linking up, but he was paralyzed by White 76. This combination is worth analyzing in detail.




Dia. 7

White had to start at 74. If he played White 1 in *Dia. 7* first, Black would counter at 2, then compromise with 4 and 6. White's prospects in the center are greatly reduced, so this is a good result for Black.



Dia. 8

After White 76, Black might consider the same counter at 1 in *Dia. 8*, but now it does not turn out so well. White plays 2 and 4 in the corner. If Black plays 5 and 7 to take away his eye space, the result is disastrous. Instead of 5, Black has to play 1 in *Dia. 9*, but then White lives with 2 and 4. Black has lost his largest territory, which is now white territory. White has more than a lead; he has the game won.




Dia. 9


Black had to play 77 to protect the top right, but White struck at 78, and took the lead by splitting Black apart with 80. Black had no way to link up, so he had to stand and fight in the center, which he did with 81 and 83. White dutifully connected at 84, but he could have done much better by giving atari at 1 in *Dia. 10*. Black has to connect at 2, and White pushes out at 3. Black can cut at 4, but White replies with 5 and 7. If Black continues at 'a', White connects at 'b'. If Black then plays 'c', White 'd' catches him in a spiral ladder. If Black plays 'e' after White 'b', White plays 'd'.

Cho probably connected at 84 because he saw further possibilities in the corner. If so, White 84 can be excused, but White 92 has to be questioned. I would have preferred to at-

tack at 1 in *Dia. 11*. To take just one continuation, after 2 and 4, Black would like to defend by cutting at 6, but White resists with 7 and 9. Black plays 10 and 12. If White now connects at 'a', Black can save himself with 'b', but White plays 13 and 15 instead and catches Black in another spiral ladder.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Cho may have been afraid that Black would play 2 in *Dia. 12*. After this move, if White fails to capture the black group, he loses the game. Perhaps Cho played White 92 because he was confident of his lead.



Dia. 12





Figure 5 (110-150)

Figure 5 (110-150). Who was right?


One may wonder why White played 10 instead of attacking the center, but Cho's decision was correct. If White continues attacking by playing 10 at A, he can easily capture the two marked stones, but that does not necessarily win. The moment White cuts at B, Black extends at 10, which is huge. White is by no means ahead. Both players were tuned to the same wavelength at this point, because as soon as White played 10, Black played 11 to prevent White A.



Dia. 13

Their thinking got out of tune when Black answered White 12 at 13, letting White play 14 in sente. Black should have answered White 12 in ko fashion at 1 in Dia. 13. When White


takes the ko, Black connects at 3, so he still ends in gote, but he has the option of retaking the ko later.



Dia. 14

Black plays 2 elsewhere.


Apparently O thought that if he saved his group in the center, he would win. Black 25 clearly lost points in the bottom left. Black should naturally have answered White 24 at C. The danger is that White 1 in Dia. 14 might be sente, but Black can safely ignore White 1. The long sequence that follows ends in a ko that is too indirect to cause any real trouble. White would have to ignore three ko threats to win it.



Dia. 15

Black 27 firmly connected Black's center group, but White seemed to take the lead again by surrounding territory with 28. Black would have preferred to save his group and reduce White's territory in the process by playing 1 in Dia. 15. The problem is that White may cut with 2 and 4, after which it is hard for Black to live. If he plays 5, hoping for White 'a' and Black 7, White can jump in at 6. Black can-

not get a second eye in this area. One does not know whether Cho would actually have played White 6, but it would have been interesting to find out.



Dia. 16

I think Black's best move was to play 27 at 1 in Dia. 16. That might have been decisive. If White answers at 2, then Black can play 3 in perfect safety. White would have to be very brave to play 2 at 'a', because his own stones on the right side are not safe.




Figure 6 (151-273)

146: connects below 140; 170: connects

O was assuming that he would win if his center lived, while Cho must have assumed that he could win without killing it, since he

passed up the attack in Dia. 11. If asked whose assumption was correct, I'd have to say it was O's. Black certainly seems to be ahead in Dia. 16.

The main causes of Black's defeat were his missing the direct ko in Dia. 13, and fearing the indirect ko in Dia. 14. He also lost points on the 31-32 transaction, but the real mystery in this game was how Cho was able to play so calmly throughout it.

Figure 6 (151-273). White wins.

White wins by 4 1/2 points.

Game Two

White: O Rissei Oza

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei

Played on January 26 & 27, 2000

Commentary by Kato Masao 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-17)

Figure 1 (1-17). Cho's new move

The opening in this game is one I often play with White. The most common continuation from White 16 is Black A-White B-Black C. Black 17, which caused quite a stir at the Nihon Ki-in, is probably a move that Cho had already thought of and was wanting to try out. It is undeniably thin. Black D is more firm, but then White will play 17, and after the lettered sequence starting from Black E, the board is dominated by White H and J.





Figure 2 (18-31)

Figure 2 (18-31). Questionable moves by both
Cho's aim seems to have been to play Black 21 in sente. To prevent this, some said that White should have played 18 at 21. After Black A and White 22, the game then goes off on another course.

Ishida Akira recommended playing White 22 at B. Cho said he would have invaded at C. If White plays D, Black invades more deeply at E, opening up a full offensive against the white group below. This may not be so good for White.



Dia. 1

I think Black should have played 23 at 31, because Black 23 still left his position full of holes. Since Black played 23, I think White should have played 24 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black can be expected to respond around 2, and then

White caps at 3. If you compare the two positions, White's is stronger and has fewer gaps.

White 24 was the correct point at which to invade the right side. White must not invade at F, because then Black's position is strengthened by the lettered sequence from Black G to White J.

White made reasonably good shape through 30. Black's shape in the top right was still incomplete, but he left it that way to invade at 31.





Figure 3 (32-46)


Figure 3 (32-46). Battlefield psychology

White's invasion at 32 was an obvious mistake. Even O might find it difficult to explain why he played here. Call it battlefield psychology — the urge to take possession of as much territory as possible. The trouble was that Black 39 made Black's position very strong, and since Black had the hane at A, White could not hope to link up. If White were going to play in this corner, he should have played 32 at B, followed by Black 37-White C-Black D, to leave Black less stable.




Dia. 2

Better yet, White should have played 32 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, answering Black 2 with White 3 to 7. In the game, he played from the opposite direction at 40, and Black slid in at 41. White's reply at 42 was all right, but White 44 left all sorts of problems for White. White 1 in *Dia. 3* would have been much simpler. If Black played 2, White could reinforce at 3; then both sides would defend their weak groups, which they could do without difficulty. After Black 45, White's position was beset with troubles both inside and out.




Dia. 3

O said that he should have played 46 at 1 in *Dia. 4*. Black might continue with 2 to 12. The fighting that follows is difficult for both sides.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (47-59). A serious oversight

White could not omit 50, because of Black 50-White A-Black B. White 56 was necessary for a similar reason.





Figure 4 (47-59)

White also had to answer Black 53 at 54, galling as that must have been. He wanted to cut at 1 in *Dia. 5*, but Black would bend out at 2, and White would have to cut again at 3. Black 4 and 6 capture one pair of white stones or the other. White does best to play 7 and 9, but after Black 10, he may as well resign.


Instead of continuing here, Black now played 57 at the top. 'I thought this was smarter style,' Cho said. Then when White played 58, Black defended at 59, to maximize the menace to the surrounding white stones. Both of these black moves were based on a terrible oversight.



Dia. 6

Black should have played 57 at 1 in *Dia. 6*. White cuts at 2, Black plays 3, and there is

practically no choice in the sequence that follows. This is an acceptable result, more acceptable to Black than to White.



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

When Cho played 59, he thought his group was alive. It wasn't, because White can attack with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. After White 7, Black is dead. Black cuts at 8, but White rescues himself with 9. If Black plays 8 at 9, White rescues himself with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 8—Black 'c'—White 'd'. Perhaps Cho thought White would play 3 at 4, in which case Black lives with Black 3—White 'e'—Black 'f'. The correct solution is a ko (Black 4 at 'f', White 4), but Black is not interested in fighting a ko that only White can gain from. The only explanation for Black 59 is that while planning how to attack White, Cho hit a mental air pocket. He could have lived unconditionally by playing 1 in *Dia. 8*. White 'a' is answered by Black 'b'. Cho said he didn't like *Dia. 8*, but living in one move is certainly better than playing one move and then dying. If White plays 2, Black can jump to 3, and it's not clear who is ahead. In any case, since Black 59 doesn't work, Black should have chosen *Dia. 6*.

O realized the true situation as soon as Black played 59. Cho caught on a move later, when White played 60.

Figure 5 (57–90). *The game grows complex.*

White was trying to play solidly in the top right, but his moves had the opposite effect. He would have done better to play 84 and cap-

ture the black group immediately, or at least to play 72 at 73. As the position grew more complex, Black's will to resist began to return, and Black 89, making a ponnuki where Black had been in atari, was colossal. With his territory on the left and right sides, however, White still had the game under control.




Figure 5 (57–90)

86: takes ko (above 83)

Figure 6 (91–114). *An easier win*

Instead of playing White 114, White could have won more easily with the lettered sequence from White A to G, which threatens to take further territory in the center with White H.




Figure 6 (91–114)




Figure 7 (115-180)

Ko: 55, 58, 61, 63

Figure 7 (115-180). A fight to the finish

After losing the first game through overconfidence, O did not make the same mistake again. He realized that Black was catching up and countered with White 40. After further ko fighting, Black captured the bottom right corner, but White captured the top right, putting victory out of Black's reach. Winning a raging fight like the one in this game must have meant a lot to O.

Black resigns after White 180.

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun Kisei

Black: O Rissei Oza

Played on February 2 & 3, 2000

Commentary by Yamashita Keigo 6-dan

Figure 1 (1-29). An ideal shape

White 4 and Black 5 bristled with fighting spirit, but when White played 10 and 12, Black blocked passively at 13. What about Black 1 to 7 in *Dia. 1*? Black may not have wanted to let White play 8 in the empty top left corner. In that case, why not cut at Black 1 in *Dia. 2* and fight it out through Black 15? I think I would have chosen this diagram. In the game, although Black got to play 17 in the empty corner, White had no complaints, because White 18 made an ideal shape.






Figure 1 (1-29)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

11: takes ko at 1

It's hard to say where Black should play 21. The trouble with a pincer is that the right side is open at the edge, but I don't know what else to suggest. Playing Black 21 high, at 22, does not look very good after White 29-Black 28-White A-Black B-White C. O may have played Black 21 with misgivings, simply because there did not seem to be anything better. The same applies to Black 29.

Figure 2 (30-71). White takes the lead.

White 30 is another difficult judgment call. The simplest idea is to cut with White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*. This is a bad cutting shape, but White gets away with it, because Black has no good move with which to defend the corner.

Instead of answering White 30 at 31, Black should probably have played 1 in *Dia. 4*.

Through 11, Black has a strong position because 'a' is his sente. In the game, he took the corner in return for the center, but it hurt to have those two black stones captured. The threat of White A also makes White B sente, which affects Black's eye shape on the right side. It seems safe to say that the sequence up to 50 put White into the lead.






Figure 2 (30-71)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 52 and 54, however, were worth less than Black 51 and 53. White should probably have played 52 at C, or at 54.

Before playing 60, or before playing 60 at 62, White should have traded White D for Black E. White D could not possibly turn out badly in this position. It was strange for Cho to miss this move. Black 69 regained much of Black's lost ground by pinning down White 56, and when Black answered White's cap at

70 by counter-capping at 71, he seemed ready to forge into the lead by battering White on the left side.





Figure 3 (72-113)

Figure 3 (72-113). *A speck of dust*


After his strong counter-cap, however, Black beat a curious retreat at 73. He had to play Black 1 in Dia. 5. If White attaches at 2, Black resists with 3, and the rest follows nearly automatically. White connects to the corner with 14 and 16, but Black plays 17. This result can't be bad for Black.



Dia. 5

O may have played Black 73 because he thought he needed to defend before fighting back, or because he thought that defending would be enough to win. Either way, he had miscalculated. For his part, Cho miscalculated

at White 84, making a bad exchange for Black 85. Black now threatened 101, so White defended at 88, a strange sequence of moves.



Dia. 6

White 108 was small. Cho called it 'a speck of dust' after the game. White 1 in *Dia. 6* was bigger. If Black cuts with 2 and 4, White can safely draw back at 5.

When Black played 113, White may still have been leading, but not by very much. If Black could settle the center successfully, he would have high hopes of winning. Adding to Black's hopes were the two-and-a-half hours of time he still had left.




Figure 4 (114-194)


71: takes ko to the right of 50;

72: connects to the right of 30

Figure 4 (114-194). An incredible oversight


White had been waiting to play 22, but this

may not have been the right moment. The focus was on the center, where Black 25 put Black in command. I think White should have played 22 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, and followed with 3 and 5. With White 'a' still a threat, White would definitely be ahead.



Dia. 7

Just when Black was about to assume the lead, however, he went wrong at Black 29. Apparently he was worried about a shortage of liberties on the right, but he should have extended to the left, at 1 in *Dia. 8*. If White captures at 2, Black plays 3. White can't save the center, so Black has the advantage.



Dia. 8

Black 45 also captured the center, but Black had no reply to White's atari at 46. Incredibly, Black had overlooked this move. The black group in the bottom right was captured, and the game was over.

Although Black had several chances to win, White had led for most of the time. One major reason was in the top right corner, where Black followed a strategy that turned out very badly.

Black resigns after White 194.

Game Four

White: O Rissei Oza

Black: Cho Chikun Kisei

Played on February 16 & 17, 2000

Commentary by Yamashita Keigo 6-dan




Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 1 (1-35). Black plays for profit.


Black 7 is unusual, but it made sense in relation to Cho's profit-seeking opening moves on the three-three points. Black 11-White 8-Black A, the normal profit-minded joseki, would have been too low here. The joseki through White 14 usually continues with Black 1 in *Dia. 1*, but Black could not play that move in this position, because of White 2 to 6. Once Black played 15, Black 16 would have been ideal, so White had to play 16 himself.

Although it is still too early in the game for definite judgments, White can hardly have been dissatisfied with getting the good points at 18 and 20.

Black 23 was a statement of Black's intention to keep playing for profit. With a strong position on the left side, he would like to play 23 at 25 to take the lead in the bottom right corner, but this is a difficult decision.

White 26 was an all-out move, typical of O,

but the bad shape made by White 32 makes one suspicious. White must have disliked having Black push into the corner with 33 and 35. White should probably have played the normal attach-and-block moves at 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. There doesn't seem to be anything wrong with the standard result through White 9.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2





Figure 2 (36-64)

Figure 2 (36-64). Black takes further profit.


The sequence White used to attack the black group at the bottom included several mysteries that I don't understand. The first was White 36. Shouldn't that have been the knight's move at A, or perhaps White 44-Black 37-White 38-Black 45, and then White A, followed by White 36 if Black captures at 47?



Dia. 3

The 42-43 exchange, propelling Black into the center, was also doubtful. White should just have played 46. After the 42-43 exchange, however, White 1 in *Dia. 3* looks like the key point, rather than White 46. If Black defends against the cut at 'a', White surrounds him at 'b'. In other words, White 1 makes 'a' and 'b' miai. White 1 may not be a severe move, but it was worth considering.

The result through 59 was that Black had taken profit and did not need to worry so much about having been cut by White 56 and 58. O may have made a slight miscalculation somewhere in this sequence.



Dia. 4

White had to answer Black 63 at 64. If White cuts at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black forces him with 2 and 4, then plays 6. Black 2 hurts badly, and Black 6 is big, so White 1 has to be rejected.





Figure 3 (65-125)

Figure 3 (65-125). Lured into the gap

The sequence from White 70 to 86, in which each side captured three stones, was nearly inevitable. Apparently O had made another miscalculation, and this time it was not slight. The end result was so favorable to Black that some would say the game was already over. Who could have predicted at this point that White would eventually win?




Dia. 5

When a player knows he is ahead, even if he does not become complacent, his awareness of the lead has a subtle effect on his play. Moves that were made with bold intentions turn out, on later reexamination, to have been meek. Black 95 may have been an example of this. In his normal mode, Cho would have chosen Black 1 in *Dia. 5* without hesitation. If


White plays 2, Black plays 3. Black 1 and 3 cannot conceivably be captured, because of Black's tremendous strength in the center.

Black must have regretted missing *Dia. 5*. When White 102 shut the door, Black could no longer afford to relax, although with his central power, he still had White in a painful grip.



Dia. 6


White 116 could not be helped. White may have considered extending to 1 in *Dia. 6* to aid his stones on the right, but to show one variation, the sequence through 17 gives a ko. Black has plenty of ko threats at the top and in the center, so White's position is still painful. This explains White's retreat at 116, but Black 117, 119, and 121 brought White to the brink of ruin. It's hard to see how White can live.



Dia. 7

O was thinking of resigning at this point, but he made one last stab by playing White

124. If he had played 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black would have disconnected him with 2 and 4. The diagonal gap left by White 124 invited Black 125, and it was only human nature for Black to accept the invitation, but this was the prelude to his defeat. Black should have played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8*. If White connects at 4, Black disconnects him again with 5 and 7, and Black's center is alive. If Black had played this way, White would surely have resigned.



Dia. 8





Figure 4 (126-245)

62: connects at 41; ko (beside 63 and 64): 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 96; 144: connects at 141; Black connects at 138

Figure 4 (126-245). A deathless group dies.

O's greatest strength is that he doesn't let himself be finished off. Even when fatally wounded, he keeps groping his way toward

an upset victory. Here, while losing half his group to Black 31 and 35, he played 32 so that he could play 74 in sente after Black captured at 63 and 65; then he thrust in at 36, abruptly reducing Black's formerly impregnable group from three eyes to one. This group was now in quite a precarious position. O had succeeded in forcing a final showdown, and Cho was presumably in minute-a-move overtime.



Dia. 9

The group died when White connected with 62 (at 41). Black 43 seems to have been the game-losing move. Black should have pushed at 1 in *Dia. 9*. If White wants to try to capture the group, White 2 is the vital point, but Black plays 3, then attaches at 5 and saves himself with the sequence through Black 11. If White now plays 'a', Black connects at 'b'.

'How can a group like this die?' Cho said afterward. He rarely lets this sort of thing happen to him, even in overtime. Everyone was dumbfounded, but some of us were glad that the series was not going to end quickly.

White wins by 12 1/2 points.

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun Kisei

Black: O Rissei Oza

Played on February 23 & 24, 2000

Commentary by Yamashita Keigo 6-dan

Figure 1 (1-100). A hasty knight's move

White 8 was a problematic response to

Black's uncommon move at 7. With an unfavorable ladder, White had to pamper Black by playing 10 from above. He could have avoided this by playing 8 at 52.

White 22 was played a little closer than usual to the bottom-left wall, as a precaution in case Black later played 51 and 53, then connected at A.





Figure 1 (1-100)

White played 36, instead of White B—Black C, so as to provoke Black 37 and start a fight in which he could use his power to the left.

White's knight's move at 60 was hasty. A two-space extension to 1 in *Dia. 1* would have been adequate. Black's preceding moves in this area had been somewhat limited in value, despite the possibility of a black wedging move at 'a' in *Dia. 1*.

White 74 was correct. Neither White 83—Black D nor White E—Black 86 looks very attractive.

Black should have traded 87 for 88 before playing 83. Since he didn't, White should have played 88 at 91, with Black 88 to be answered by White A. That would have turned out well for White, whereas White 88 turned out tolerably well for Black, who captured five stones with 95.



Dia. 1

been correctly timed, but pushing on at White 36 was doubtful. When Cho played 28 and 30, surely he was looking ahead to White 1 to 7 in *Dia. 2*, and now was the time to go into action. One variation is the sequence through White 19, in which White takes the top right in return for the center. With the white connection at 'a' also remaining, this trade favors White.

White had another chance to play *Dia. 2* when Black jumped to 37, but instead he immediately attached at White 38. Cho may have expected Black to answer this move.

White 42 was impressive, but White ended up losing points on the maneuver, because Black 63 was huge. Once Black captured here, he could not be overtaken.




Figure 2 (101-257)


127: connects at 40; 153 at 18;
154: at 69; 157: at 100

Figure 2 (101-257). White misses his chance.

Black 3 and White 4 were appropriate. Further fiddling in the corner would just have exposed Black to the threat of White 105.

Black 13 to 17 were big, because if White got connected up, the black group could come under pressure. These moves did not put Black into the lead, however. The game was about even.

Black 29 and 31 accomplished more than White 28 and 30. White 32 and 34 may have



Dia. 2

O's toughness requires no further comment, but he is also something of a magician, changing moves, changing quality, skillfully disrupting his opponent's flow of thought, especially in the endgame. The fourth game was a particularly good example of 'O magic', and Cho may still have been feeling the effects of that loss. Fatigue may have been another factor, for in both games, Cho made mistakes under time pressure.

Black wins by 5 1/2 points.

Games 1 to 6 from *Gekkan Go Waarudo*, March and April 2000. Translated by James Davies.

The 12th Mingren Title Match: Game Three

Ma Xiaochun vs. Chang Hao

Chang Hao may be rated the number one Chinese player, but he still wasn't able to break Ma's stranglehold on this most prestigious of Chinese titles. Ma has held the Mingren (Meijin) title for 11 straight terms and, by defeating Chang three games in a row in the best-of-five title match, he showed his determination to hang on to it. Below we give the third and final game of the match.

White: Ma Xiaochun Mingren

Black: Chang Hao 9-dan

Played on November 9, 1999.




Figure 1 (1-50)
34: at 27


Figure 1 (1-50)

White 8 was an unusual move. It loses territory, but, since Ma had a two-game lead, he probably wanted to play a leisurely game.

Black 25 starts operations against the white stones in the bottom left, intending to build a wall that will combine with his stone at 23, but White counterattacks with 26. Instead of Black 25, sliding to 30 would be the normal move.

A ko arises in the top left with the sequence to White 32; Black plays 33 as his ko threat. At this early stage in the game, there are no ko threats, so White ends the ko by connecting at 34. As compensation for his loss in the upper left, Black stands at 35 and effectively traps the five white stones in the lower left.

After the game, Ma remarked that if this position arose again in another game, he would extend to White 1 as in *Dia. 1* instead of making the approach move of 36. After Black encloses he corner with 2, he would extend to White 3.



Dia. 1

Black 45 and 47 were strong moves.

Evaluating the position up to 50, Ma said that he didn't think White had a good game.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100)

Black's aim in attaching at 53 is to first strengthen his group at the bottom, then en-


circle White's group in the lower right corner by jumping to A. Therefore, White defended at 54. But Black now gets to make another move against the white position at the bottom with 55, so he is quite satisfied with this result.

With 70, White settles his shape at the bottom, but Black has more territory.

Black 71 may have been a bit simplistic. Because of this move, White has been able to map out a moyo in the center as well as to map out territory in the top left with 84. Playing Black 71 one line to the left of 84 would have been better.


Black 89 played one line to the right of 90 would be more concise.

White doesn't want to make a two-space extension to B because Black might attach at C and use his thickness above to fight.



Dia. 2

According to Ma, before playing White 92 and 94, White should force with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 3

White 98 was a careless move. White should first hane with 1 in *Dia. 3*. After White 5, Black has sente, but he has to worry about the bad aji of White 'a' and 'b'.

Figure 3 (101–150)

Wedging in with Black 1 is a tesuji. Because of this move, White can't capture the black stones in the upper left. In fact, White's stones

on the left are the ones that are now cut off.

When White plays 8, instead of simply connecting at A, Black jumps into White's sphere of influence at the top with 9. However, if Black played at A, his group on the left is in great danger. White might play the sequence White B–Black C–White D–Black E, but it is unclear whether or not he could live.




Figure 3 (101–150)

18: left of 14; 25: below 21; 49: below 45

Figure 4 (151–186)

Black 53 was the losing move. He should have connected at 54 instead. When White played 54, the game was over.

186 move. Black resigns.




Figure 4 (151–186)

79, 85: below 72; 82: at 72

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
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Tesuji Problems


Exploiting the Enemy's Shortage of Liberties

Spotting a defect in your opponent's position is usually the key to killing his stones and saving your own in a capturing race. One such defect to always watch out for is stones which are short of liberties. The seven problems that follow all use different tesujis; in each case, White loses the capturing race because he is short of liberties. Answers are given on the next page.




Problem 1

Black to capture six stones in the corner.




Problem 2

Black to capture six white stones.




Problem 3

Black to capture the six stones on the left.




Problem 4

Black to capture three stones in the corner.




Problem 5

Black to link up his three stones on the right with his allies on the left.



Problem 6

Black to capture the three marked stones.




Problem 7

White is threatening to cut at A. What should Black do?


Answers to the Tesuji Problems

Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black turns at 1, then plays the 'clamp' tesuji of 3 when White blocks at 2. If White connects at A, Black will atari at B; if White B, Black will throw in a stone at A. In both cases, White can't capture because he is short of liberties.




Dia. 1
Correct Answer



Dia. 2
Wrong Answer 1


Dia. 2. Although turning at Black 1 is correct, Black 3 is a mistake. After White 8, it is Black whose stones are short of liberties.




Dia. 3. Wrong Answer 2
Black 9: played at White 6

Dia. 3. Black can save his two stones by jumping into the corner with 1. However, after Black connects with 9 (at 6), White turns at 10 and the corner has become a seki.

Problem 2




Dia. 1
Correct Answer



Dia. 2
Variation

Dia. 1. Even though the connection of Black 1 is a bit removed from the main arena of fighting, it is the tesuji that decides the battle. If White double ataris with 2, Black will atari with 3. White is now short of liberties. Whichever way White captures, at least five of his stones will still be in atari.

Dia. 2. If White answers Black 1 by connecting at 2, Black again plays 3. White can't save his stones by capturing at A because Black will recapture with a snapback.




Dia. 3. Wrong Answer


Dia. 3. Connecting at Black 1 is a wasted move. White need not respond; no matter what Black does now, he can't capture the white stones.

Problem 3

Dia. 1. The diagonal attachment of Black 1 threatens a snapback at 2, so White must defend there. Next, Black plays 3; White is short of liberties, so he can't approach the three black stones in the corner and his seven stones on the left will die.




Dia. 1
Correct Answer



Dia. 2
Wrong Answer 1

Dia. 2. Black 3 misses the vital point. White can now play 4 and capture the three black stones in the corner.




Dia. 3. Wrong Answer 2

Dia. 3. If Black ataris at 1, he has no follow-up after White connects at 2.

Problem 4


Dia. 1. Playing in between the two white stones from the outside with Black 1 is the tesuji. If White connects at 2, Black hanes with 3. Now White can't play at A because he is short of liberties.



Dia. 1
Correct Answer

Dia. 2
Variation

Dia. 2. If White blocks at 2, White throws in a stone at 3. White can't capture at A because Black will recapture at 3 in a snapback.




Dia. 3. Wrong Answer

Dia. 3. Playing on the inside with Black 1 is the wrong direction. The sequence to Black 5 is a 'one-way street', but, when White captures with 6, the corner will be decided by a ko.

Problem 5


Dia. 1. Playing in between the two white stones with 1 is the tesuji. If White ataris with 2, Black will atari two stones with 3. White can't connect at A because he is short of liberties.



Dia. 1
Correct Answer

Dia. 2
Variation


Dia. 2. If White first tries to correct his defect by connecting at 2, Black will capture two stones with the atari of 3.



Dia. 3. Wrong Answer 2

Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 are vulgar moves. After White connects at 4, the black stones on the right are permanently separated from their allies on the left.


Problem 6




Dia. 1
Correct Answer

Dia. 1. Black casts a net with the knight's move of 1, trapping the white stones. If White tries to escape with 2, Black 3 closes the door on them.

Dia. 2. If White moves straight out with 2, Black blocks with 3. After White 4 and 6, Black's stones look thin, but, when Black ataris with 7, White can't capture the black stones because Black will recapture with a snapback.



Dia. 2
Variation




Dia. 3
Wrong Answer

Dia. 3. The one-space jump of Black 1 is the usual way of casting a net, but, in this case, it is not a tesuji, as the sequence to White 10 shows.


Problem 7

Dia. 1. The belly attachment of Black 1 is the tesuji. If White resists with 2, Black keeps up the pressure with 3. After Black descends

to 5, White can neither live in the corner nor cut off the four black stones.




Dia. 1
Correct Answer



Dia. 2
Variation

Dia. 2. In response to Black 1, White might hane with 2. However, White's stones are doomed after Black 3 and 5.




Dia. 3. Wrong Answer

Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 prevent White from linking up at A, but now White can cut at 4 and capture the two black stones at the bottom.


From the supplement to *Baduk Monthly* June 1999.

An Introduction to Basic Josekis (7)

In this issue's installment we are going to briefly look at the attach-and-extend joseki shown in *Dia. 1*. This joseki is most frequently played in handicap games. We will then look at the attach-and-block joseki in *Dia. 2*. This joseki has recently been played in professional games, most notably by Cho Chikun. The hallmark of both of these josekis is that by attaching Black can secure the corner territory. Its drawback is that it also enables White to secure his own stones as well




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Attach-and-extend joseki *Attach-and-block joseki*



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


The sequence to Black 8 in *Dia. 3* is the basic joseki. White could also play 7 at A. Black gets a thick position which secures the corner. If Black had a stone on the side star point (as he would in a six-stone handicap game), his position on the left side would be nearly impregnable. This is why this joseki is recommended to players who must take a large handicap.

The attachment of 5 in *Dia. 4* is one way White might play so as to diminish Black's corner territory. Black builds a wall with the sequence to 12, then extends to 14 and builds a moyo on the left side. This is another basic joseki.

Later, White might have a chance to cut at 1 in *Dia. 5*. With the sequence to 5, White gets the corner territory. However, he ends in gote and Black's moyo on the left has become even thicker. If Black had played 14 one line lower in *Dia. 4*, his stones would end up being overconcentrated.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Black can also block at 2 in *Dia. 6*. This is also a joseki. The advantage of this move is that after 4 and 6, Black's position has no cutting points for White to aim at as in *Dia. 5*. Black 6 is now the ideal extension from his wall, and his corner is secure.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


After Black blocks with 4 in *Dia. 2*, the atari of White 1 in *Dia. 7* is essential. Black's shape may not be good, but, as compensation, the territory he has mapped out in the corner is secure. Next, White has three ways to play: at A, B, or C.

If White connects in the center with 1 in *Dia. 8*, the sequence to Black 6 is the basic joseki. White 5 is an important move because

it prevents Black from expanding along the bottom by playing A later.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10


Black must not be afraid of the ko. Connecting with 2 in *Dia. 9* is overly cautious. White will take the initiative on the left with 3. If Black tries to break out at the bottom with 4, White confines him to the corner with 5 and 7.

If White neglects to play at A (5 in *Dia. 8*) in *Dia. 10* and plays 4 instead, Black can break out along the bottom with 5. This result is not necessarily bad for White. However, because Black's position at the bottom is low and White 4 is an important point. Whether or not this variation is good for White depends on the overall position.

If Black wants to avoid the ko, he can slide to 1 in *Dia. 11*. This is a nice tesuji that prevents White from separating this stone from its allies on the left. Taking the big point at 2, and letting Black play 3 is one variation.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12

If the bottom is important, White can block with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 12*. Black will then jump to 5 and secure a large corner.


Let's look at an example from a professional game.



Dia. 13


White has the marked stone in place in *Dia. 13*, so he immediately jumps to 8 instead of following the joseki and capturing the black stone at 1.

If White does capture with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 14*, Black will not atari at 'a'. Instead, he will play the vital point at 4 and break up White's position on the right side.




Dia. 14

Connecting at White 3 in *Dia. 15* is the second main variation of this joseki. Black secures the lower left with 4, and White takes up position along the bottom with 5. Next, White can take a big point under the star point on the left side or play elsewhere. Black 4 at A is also possible, but there is some bad aji in the corner for Black. For example —



Dia. 15




Dia. 16


14, 16: at 6;
15: at 10

After Black 1, White can attach at 2 in *Dia. 16*. If Black goes after the white stones with 3 and 5, White starts a squeeze with 6 and 8. After White 18, the black stones at the bottom are dead.

Therefore, Black must defend his cutting point with 4 in *Dia. 17* and let White live in the corner with the sequence to 7.




Dia. 17




Dia. 18

After White 1, Black can start a fight by cutting with 2 in *Dia. 18*. After the exchange of White 3 for Black 4, both sides secure their positions with 5 and 6.

Descending to White 7 in *Dia. 19* is the third main variation of this joseki. White's aim here is to get territory at the bottom. He will play this way when the center is not important.




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

The sequence to White 7 in *Dia. 20* is the basic joseki. Black 8 is an important move. Many players would be tempted to block at A instead, but Black 8 is more prudent.

If Black plays the marked stone in *Dia. 21*, White could snatch the corner territory away from him by making a placement at 1 and descending to 3 after Black 2. Answering White 1 with A would be dangerous because White has a lot of aji on the left side.



Dia. 21




Dia. 22


Instead of turning at A, White could immediately invade at 1 in *Dia. 22*. If Black 2, White

links up to his stones on the right with 3. Black takes advantage of his thick wall by making a moyo with 4.

Instead of 6 in *Dia. 20*, Black could capture with 5 in *Dia. 23*. This enables Black to block at 7, daring White to play A.



Dia. 23



Dia. 24

If White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 24*, he can certainly live with 5, but Black 6 is a severe attack, so White must fall back and play the vital point of 7 to live. Black next makes an extremely thick position with 8 and 10.

The Cover

A Burlesque of Grand Minister Kibi


by William Pinckard

Under the title of 'Tricks of Three Countries', this is a satirical comment on a political crisis that arose in 1874 as the result of a fierce struggle between two cabinet ministers. Saigo Takamori, a Marshal of the Imperial Army, wanted Japan to mount an immediate invasion of Korea in order to counter the influence of China, while Count Okubo, the Home Minister, wanted a few more years of peace in order to make the army and navy stronger.

The dignified gentleman in black robes at the left, identified here as Kibi Daijin (see *Go*


World 47, page 6), represents the old-fashioned samurai leader Saigo, whom Yoshitoshi held in great admiration. The cringing figure in Chinese garb at the right, saying impudently, 'I'll take white, if you please,' represents Korea, and the woman who looks at Kibi remarking 'Whether he wins or loses, he's a fine fellow indeed!' represents contemporary public opinion, which favored an immediate invasion. Fearful of censorship, both the artist and the publisher left their names off the print.

Eight Fuseki Problems




Problem 1. Black to play

What is the best move, A or B, for Black to attack the marked stone so that he can take advantage of his thick wall at the bottom?




Problem 3. Black to play

Where should Black play after White jumps with the marked stone: at A or at B?



Problem 2. Black to play


White has just attached with the marked stone. Playing an ordinary joseki will lead to a bad result for Black. How should Black respond, at A or B?



Problem 4. Black to play


White has just invaded at the 3-3 point with the marked stone. On which side should Black block: at A or at B?

to Test Your Sense of Direction




Problem 5. Black to play

White has just attached with the marked stone. Should Black answer at A or at B?




Problem 7. Black to play

How should Black respond to the marked white stone, at A or at B?



Problem 6. White to play

White's marked stone at the top has no allies to help it, so it must fend for itself. What is the best way for White to handle this situation. To slide to A or to extend to B?




Problem 8. Black to play

White runs away with the marked stone. How should Black continue the attack, at A or at B?


Answers to the Fuseki Problems

Problem 1



Correct Answer


Black should make a checking extension from the bottom with 1. White 2 is the natural response, but Black forces with 3, then attaches with 5. These two moves create an obstacle which White will find impossible to break through. If White plays the sequence to 10, Black makes an impressive moyo when he extends to 11.



Failure


Making a checking extension from above is the wrong direction. After White exchanges 2 for 3, White jumps to 4. White's stones are safe and Black's thick wall is now nearly worthless.

Problem 2



Correct Answer


Black 1 and White 2 start a standard joseki, but Black deviates from it and descends to 3. This is an unorthodox move, but it is best in this position. Black secures the corner with the sequence to 9 and White makes thickness with 10. Next, Black plays 11 to neutralize White's thick position on the right. If White 12, Black plays 13, and he has a good game.



Failure 1

12: at the marked stone

The sequence to Black 13 is the joseki given in books, but White 14 makes the two black stones heavy and builds a large sphere of influence at the bottom.




Failure 2

Eight Fuseki Problems


Black 1 and 3 in *Failure 2* start another joseki. The continuation of White A–Black B–White C–Black D–White E holds little prospects for Black at the bottom because of the presence of the marked white stone.

Problem 3



Correct Answer

Black should simply jump to 1. White has to do something about the black stone, and 2 is the natural move. However, even if he captures it, his prospect on the right side are not good because of the marked black stone.




Failure

It is not a good idea for Black to build a moyo on the right side with 1 and 3. After


White 2 and 4, the black stone in the upper right corner is in trouble and the marked white stones limit the potential of the black moyo on the right.

Problem 4



Correct Answer


Blocking at Black 1 is the correct direction. With the sequence to 11, Black builds a thick wall, then extends to 13. White 14 defends against an invasion at Black A, giving Black the chance to expand his moyo with 15. If Black plays 5 at 6, White will hane at B and the joseki will end in gote for Black. White would then extend to C and neutralize Black's wall.



Failure 1

Blocking at 1 is the wrong direction. After the sequence to White 10, the marked stone is misplaced. White is threatening to cut at A and the marked stone would be better placed at B.


Eight Fuseki Problems



Failure 2


Black might play more aggressively with the two-step hane of 1. However, after the sequence to White 8, Black is left with the bad aji of White A which will come to life if White plays at B.

Problem 5



Correct Answer


Black should hane on the inside with 1 and make territory in the lower right corner with the sequence to 9. Next, both Black and White secure their stones at the bottom with 10 and 11.



Failure


If Black hanes on the outside with 1 in the failure diagram, the sequence to White 10 will result. The marked stone is not working efficiently; it would be better placed at A.

Problem 6



Correct Answer

Sliding to 1 is White's best move. It makes a base in the corner for his stones and denies Black the security of the corner. Black must extend to 2, but White can now attack the two black stones with the extension of 3. White 1 at A is a slack move. Black will play the knight's move at B. If White next slides to 1, Black can secure territory on the right side by extending to 3.




Failure

The proverb advise us not to approach thickness. Black 1 violates this adage by ex-


tending right up against Black's thick position in the top left. Black responds by attaching at 2 and jumping to 4. The white stones are under attack.

Problem 7




Correct Answer

White is threatening to make a huge moyo in the center, but the diagonal move of Black 1 is the vital point to prevent White from carrying out his plan. White 2 and 4 prevent Black from getting territory on the upper right side. Next, Black attacks the white stones with 5, 7, and 9. White's hope of building a vast moyo in the center has been dashed.



Failure 1


Black 1 and 3 in *Failure 1* are slack moves. White attacks with 4 to 8, and Black will be unable to break into White's moyo after 12.



Failure 2


The knight's move of Black 1 in *Failure 2* is the worst move. White first forces with 2 and 4, then plays on the vital point of 6. White is building a vast moyo and playing on a grand scale. Next, White will aim to invade at A.

Problem 8



Correct Answer

Black should attack from the outside with 1, aiming to build a moyo in the center. White exchanges 2 for 3, then jumps to 4. Black next plays 5 and White jumps to 6, linking up his stones on the left to his allies at the top. Finally, Black jumps to 7, making a moyo in the center. If White 4 at A, Black will play at B.



Failure

Black 1 is not the way to attack. White will exchange 2 for 3, then jump to 4 and 6. White is out into the open and Black has gained nothing for his efforts.

Go World News

*(Continued from page 14)***Most consecutive wins (5-dan and up)**

1. Hane Naoki: 19
2. Takao Shinji: 14
3. Mizogami Tomochika: 13
4. Nakamura Shinya, Akiyama Jiro, Yanaka Katsunori 6-dan, Kono Rin: 12

Top prize money winners

1. Cho Chikun: ¥106,952,000
2. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥86,930,000
3. O Rissei: ¥47,986,000
4. Cho Sonjin: ¥40,666,000
5. Yoda Norimoto: ¥31,213,000
6. Kobayashi Satoru: ¥25,383,000
7. Hikosaka Naoto: ¥23,849,000
8. Yamada Kimio: ¥23,627,000
9. Kato Masao: ¥22,803,000
10. Yamashita Keigo: ¥21,778,000

The above ten were the only players to top 20 million yen, and only the next nine managed to top ten million. Two women made the top 20: Kobayashi Izumi (no. 17 with ¥12,637,000) and Chinen Kaori (no. 19 with ¥10,739,000).

Kansai Ki-in prizes for 1999

Outstanding player: Kiyonari Tetsuya 9-dan (2nd in Kisei 9-dan section)

Risen Prize: Moriyama Naoki 9-dan, Kurahashi Masayuki 9-dan

New Face Prize, Most Successive Wins: Hasegawa Hiro 5-dan

Yamano Prize: Tono Hiroaki 9-dan

Nagai Prize: Fujii Shusai 4-dan

Korea**Most wins**

The following list of players with 30 wins or more is culled from a report on the 1999 results of the top 30 players in Korea, so we can't guarantee that they were the top of all Korean professionals.

1. Lee Chang-ho: 59-14
2. Mok Jin-seuk 4-dan: 52-22

3. Cho Hun-hyun: 47-14
4. Ahn Jo-yeo 5-dan: 45-15
5. Yoo Chang-hyuk, Seo Bong-soo: 38-18
7. Lee Se-dol 3-dan: 37-18
8. Kang Ji-song 3-dan: 36-19
9. Kim Sung-chan 6-dan: 35-20; Kim Myong-hwan 4-dan: 35-20
11. Rui Naiwei: 34-6; Yun Hun-chul 5-dan: 34-13; Lee Sang-Hun 3-dan: 34-15; Cho Myong-Hun 7-dan: 34-18
15. Kim Song-yong 6-dan: 33-15; Kim Man-soo 4-dan, Cho Han-sung 3-dan: 33-16; Park Ji-won: 33-17
19. Lee Sung-jae 5-dan: 31-19

Just for the record, Rui's husband Jiang Zhujiu scored 15-9.

Best winning percentage

1. Rui Naiwei: 85%
2. Lee Chang-ho: 81%
3. Cho Hun-hyun: 77%
4. Kim Sung-Ryong: 69%
5. Yoo Chang-hyuk, Seo Bong-soo: 68%

Most prize money

1. Lee Chang-ho: 816,000,000 won (about ¥80,000,000 or \$760,000) (top for the fifth year in a row)
2. Yoo Chang-hyuk: 320,000,000 won
3. Cho Hun-hyun 247,439,000 won
4. Seo Bong-soo 78,670,000 won

China**Chinese rankings**

The latest Chinese ranking list we have to hand was issued in autumn 1999. The top ten are:

1. Chang Hao: 2711
2. Ma Xiaochun: 2704
3. Zhou Heyang: 2658
4. Luo Xihe: 2653
5. Wang Lei: 2645
6. Yu Bin: 2642
7. Shao Weigang: 2624
8. Liu Xiaoguang: 2614

9. Ding Wei: 2598
10. Nie Weiping: 2584

Compared to the rankings of a year earlier (GW83, page 36), Ma (then 2674) has narrowed the gap with Chang (then 2705).

Late news

Korea wins Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup

The results of the final, Seoul round of the 1st Nong Shim Spicy Noodles Cup came through just before we went to press. Just like its predecessor, the Jinro Cup, this tournament has ended in a triumph for Korea.

The Seoul round started out with an impressive three successive wins by China's number one, Chang Hao, who beat two of Korea's top players in Cho and Yoo and also Yamada of Japan. However, Japan's new Honinbo, Cho Sonjin, showed his class by putting a stop to Chang's winning run.

At this stage the tournament looked exactly level, with each country having one

player left, but no tournament is even when Korea still has Lee Chang-ho. Once again, he showed that he is almost invincible in international go.


We haven't seen the game records, but judging by the results it seems that Lee had no trouble disposing of the last players for Japan and China. Thanks to his efforts, Korea continues its remarkable monopoly of this team tournament.

Results of the Seoul round


- (22 March). Chang Hao (China) (W) beat Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) by 3½ points.
- (23 March). Chang beat Yamada Kimio (Japan) by 1½ points.
- (24 March). Chang Hao (W) beat Yoo Chang-hyuk (China) by resignation.
- (26 March). Cho Sonjin (Japan) (B) beat Chang Hao by 2½ points.
- (28 March). Lee Chang-ho (Korea) (W) beat Cho Sonjin by resignation.
- (29 March). Lee (W) beat Ma Xiaochun (China) by resignation.

Two Endgame Problems

In the following two problems, you are asked to find the best moves for both Black and White. Determine which side wins and by how much. No prisoners have been taken. Capturing the marked stones in Problem 1 and playing at 'a' in Problem 2 are the biggest moves, but if you start with any of these, you will not be playing the best endgame. The answers start on the next page.



Problem 1. Black to play



Problem 2. Black to play

Answers to the Endgame Problems

Problem 1

1. Amateur against a professional

First of all we will show how one amateur played this endgame against a professional.




Figure 1 (1-8)

Black plays 1 in the upper left corner in sente. He then plays sente moves in the lower right with 3 and 5. Next, he defends his two stones in the center with 7 in gote. These are certainly important places to play, but Black's moves were not the best.




Figure 2 (9-17)

Black continued with 9 and 11 in the upper right corner, ending in gote. The game is over when Black connects with 17.

The result after all the neutral points are filled is shown in Figure 3. Here is the count:

Black's territory:

Right side	= 15 points
The top left	= 12 points
Total	= 27 points

White's territory:

The bottom	= 18 points
The top	= 14 points (includes the captured stones at the points marked X)
Total	= 32 points




Figure 3: The result
White wins by five points.

2. Professional against a professional

Next we show how the professional played this endgame for Black.




Figure 4 (1-3)

Black 1 is the tesuji; White has no other move but to connect at 2. Next, Black plays 3.






Figure 5 (4-11)

White has no other move but to capture two stones with 4 and 6 in Figure 5. Let's calculate the difference between this position and the position in Figure 3.

Dia. 1 shows the position in *Figure 3*. Using the point K as the border of White's territory, White has taken nine points here (the five points marked 'a' plus four points for the two dead black stones).



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 shows the position which resulted in *Figure 2*. With K as the border of White's territory, White gets four points for the two stones he has capture plus the point to the left of K. This shows that Black 1 in *Figure 4* is four points bigger than Black 1 in *Figure 1*.

Black 7 is another important move. When Black played 9 and 11 in *Figure 2*, he ended in gote. Since Black 7 in *Figure 5* forces White to capture with 8, it is White who ends in gote. There is no difference in territory here; it is only the difference between sente and gote.


Notice that if White omits 8, Black can play here and White can't separate the three black stones from the stone at 7 because he is short of liberties, so White will lose five stones and Black will save two of his.

Black 9 is subtle move. After 10, Black 'a' becomes sente. That is, Black can throw in at 1 in *Dia. 3*. White must capture with 2 and Black ataris with 3. Next, Black 3 and 5 force White to play 4 and 6.



Dia. 3

5: captures at 1



Dia. 4

Therefore, when White plays 1 in *Dia. 4*, White must answer at 'a'.

Black 11 is now the biggest move on the board.






Figure 6 (11-14)

White ataris the stone at 11 with 12 in sente, then plays 14. Let's calculate the value of Black 11 and White 14.

Black 1 in *Dia. 5* is worth six points: it gets the two points marked 'a' and rescues the two stones that White gets when he plays 14 in *Figure 6*.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

How big is Black 11? Normally, White can exchange 1 for 2 in *Dia. 6* in sente. Black gets three points of territory here (two points for the stone he captured and one point two spaces above Black 2).



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

If White connects at 1 in *Dia. 7*, he increases his territory by three points (normally, it must be assumed that White will play 'a' and Black will play 'b').

However, White 14 in *Figure 6* is gote, so Black can play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8*. Moreover White must eventually connect at 'a'. There-

fore, Black 11 in Figure 6 is worth more than six points; it is more like eight points.




Figure 7 (15-23)

Black 15 and 17 in Figure 7 gets two points in gote.

White 18 gets one point in sente and White 20 is worth two points in gote. Black 21 forces White to connect at 22, enabling Black to get the last point at 23.




Figure 8: The result

Figure 8 shows the position after all the neutral points have been filled. The points marked with an X are where stones have been captured.

Black's territory:

Right side = 16 points

Left side = 14 points (includes the three captured stones)

Total = 30 points

White's territory:

The bottom = 15 points (includes the one captured stone)

The top = 14 points (includes the captured stones)

Total = 29 points

Black wins by one point.

Problem Two

1. Amateur against a professional

Let's first look at the amateur's attempt at this endgame.




Figure 1 (1-12)

Black 1 is certainly the biggest move in absolute terms (worth eight points), but White 2 to 6 are more important. Black 7 is not best. White 10 is worth four points and Black 11 and White 12 are both worth three points.




Figure 2 (13-23)

Only two- and three-point moves remain. The game ends when Black plays 23.

The result after all the neutral points have been filled is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: The result

Black's territory:

The left side = 7 points
 The top and center = 17 points
 Total = 24 points

White's territory:

The bottom = 16 points
 The top left = 7 points
 The top right = 6 points
 Total = 29 points

White wins by five points.

2. Professional against a professional




Figure 4 (1-5)

The cuts of Black 1 and Black 5 are important endgame tesujis. Because of 1, Black can play 3 in sente instead of gote as the amateur did in Figure 2 with 15 and 17.

The effect of the tesuji of Black 5 is shown in the Figure 5.






Figure 5 (5-11)

White answers Black 5 with 6 in Figure 5. Black can now play the attachment tesuji of 7. White must capture the black stone with 8 and Black connects with 9 in sente. White's territory is reduced to four points instead of six points as in the amateur's game in Figure 1.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

If White answer Black 1 with 2 in Dia. 1, the attachment of Black 3 still works, since White can't cut off the black stone at 3 by playing 'a'.

Actually, Black could simply attach at 1 in Dia. 2. Again White can't cut at 'a', so the result is the same.

Black 11 in Figure 5 is the next sacrifice tesuji.





Figure 6 (11-23)

When Black attaches at 11, White has no choice but to block with 12. White then cuts with 13 and squeezes with 15. This gives Black the corner in sente. White 6 in the amateur's game in Figure 1, prevented Black from playing this tesuji.




Dia. 3


Black 1 in Dia. 3 is inept. It leaves the possibility open of White playing at 'a'.

Having exhausted all of his sente endgame moves, Black finally encircles the two white stones with 17. If White were to connect at 17, the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'–Black 'd' would be his privilege. This shows that Black 17 is worth eight points.

White 22 is worth four points and Black 23 is worth three points. This might require some explanation because Black 23 seems to be worth only two points.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

When Black connects with the marked stone in *Dia. 4*, Black 1 is now Black's privilege. White must respond by connecting at 2. If he omits this move, Black will play the sequence Black 2–White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'–Black 2, capturing two stones. White can't connect at 2 because he will find his stones short of liberties and Black will capture at 'c'.

Black 1 in *Dia. 5* is a bad move. It doesn't even gain a point because Black will eventually have to play at 'a', and Black 'b' is no longer sente because the aji describe in *Dia. 4* has been erased.

When White plays 28 in *Figure 6*, Black gets his chance to play 29. After White 30, Black goes back to defend at 31.





Figure 6 (23–31)

If Black answers White 1 in *Dia. 6* by connecting at 2, White will connect at 3. Black has lost a point.

However, if White doesn't play 28 in *Figure 6*, but connects at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black can regain the point lost in the lower right by playing 2 and 4 in the upper left.



The Korean Style (3)


Korean Joseki Innovations

Oya Koichi 8-dan


3. The side contact play: Part II

Let's get right into it. Have a look at *Dia.*

1. What is your impression of this sequence? The small-knight move of Black 2 has been very popular among professionals in recent years. I guess most of my readers would now want to slide to 3. This is a very subtle question, so let's look at some of the ramifications.




Dia. 1: a popular move



Dia. 2: a standard sequence

Dia. 2. Here Black has played the marked stone, a one-space jump. The sequence to 3 is often seen. White regrets having to make the exchange of 1 for Black 2, as the 3-3 diagonal move stabilizes Black's group. However, White also stabilizes himself by extending to 3. Moreover, the marked stone leaves a weakness at 'a'. White can invade at 'a' or use the threat of doing so to apply pressure to Black.


Dia. 3. Even if Black encloses the corner with 1, White still has the threat of 'a'. However, if the marked black stone is the small-knight move, the corner is pretty well secure black territory. To go back to *Dia. 1*, I hope it's now clear why White is tempted to slide at 3 there.




Dia. 3: the corner is not yet secured

The preamble has gone on long enough. This instalment's theme concerns the moment after White slides to 3 in *Dia. 1*. Eh, isn't that the same as the previous instalment? That's up to the reader to discover.

Dia. 4. The contact play of 1 is the same as in the previous instalment, but the location of the marked stone is different. This kind of low position is generally considered not suited to attack. However, sometimes an attack may be all the more effective just because of a low position.



Dia. 4: similar but different



Dia. 5: ladder irrelevant


Dia. 5. When the marked stone is on the fourth line, the precondition for attaching at 1 is a favourable ladder (see GW87, p. 60).

However, there's no need for such worries with the marked stone. Even if White captures two stones with 2 to 10, Black gets a large corner up to 9. The marked black stones squashes any life left in the marked white stone.

Dia. 6. If White wants to pull off anything in the corner, he will start with the diagonal move of 1. I would like to urge the reader to remember Black's answer at 2. The continuation to 10 shows that White can't live.

After Black 10, White does have the aji of attaching at 'a' or playing the sequence of White 'b'–Black 'a'–White 'c', but these are not immediate problems.


If Black carelessly blocks at 'b' instead of 2, White lives easily with 3. Note that White 'd' will be sente.



Dia. 7. In the previous instalment, we looked at White's move at 1 (GW87, p. 60, *Dia. 7*). With the high marked stone, the corner is easily transformed into white territory. Black has gained nothing from his play if White not only captures the two stones on the outside but also lives in the corner.

There's one more advantage for Black with the low move.

Dia. 8. Black can eliminate the bad aji referred to in *Dia. 6* with a move at 1 or 'a'. Happily, this not only protects the corner but also aims at developing along the left side.





In *Dia. 7*, Black hasn't got a move that's just right for preventing White from getting up to any tricks in the corner.


That reminds me — there was another ladder problem in the previous instalment.

Dia. 9. What should Black do if White captures with 1 and 3? If the ladder is unfavourable, Black can't play 4 and 6: White moves out with 7 and Black's position falls to pieces. You'd have to avert your eyes.

In this position, Black must keep his cool.




Dia. 10. Black should simply atari at 1. White 2 is essential, so Black can be satisfied to switch to a large point elsewhere. Players who pride themselves on their fighting strength may not be convinced, so —




Dia. 11. Here's a tewari analysis. Let's assume that Black made the shoulder hit at 1 when White slid into the corner. That's a feasible strategy. White 2 in response is really thin — you could call it a bad move. Black 3 and 5 are a tesuji to make the forcing move of 7 sente. White can't play 8 at 'a', thanks to the sacrifice of 5.

This analysis demonstrates that the result in *Dia. 10* is adequate for Black.

Dia. 12. Regardless of whether the ladder is favourable or unfavourable, White has no choice but to hane at 2. Black then pulls back at 3, as in the previous issue.



Dia. 12: the only move




Dia. 13: playing on both sides

Dia. 13. If White 1, Black defends with 2. He has succeeded in playing both in the corner and at the bottom. If he later hanes at 'a' and connects, the marked stone will be right on the vital point, stripping White of eye shape. This is what Black is hoping for.


When White connects at 1, he will stake his fortunes on attacking at 3. This would give him a reasonable game if he had really strong thickness on the right side to back him up. However, a hane by Black at 'a' will be pretty well sente, so Black has no reason to avoid this fight.

From this point on, we are going to look only at variations different from those in the previous instalment. Please refer to it for other responses by White that we haven't touched on above.




Dia. 14: an alternative for Black

Dia. 14. If he wishes, Black can answer the descent of 1 by turning at 2. If White 3, he secures the corner with 4 and aims at applying further pressure to White. White may reinforce himself with 5 and 7, but Black has nothing to worry about in the corner because of the low position of the marked stone, so he pushes up at 8, building up his influence at the bottom.




Dia. 15: stylish

Dia. 15. If White goes for safety-first with 3, Black has the stylish move of 4. Hastening into action with Black 'a' or 'b' would not be a wise policy. Black should quietly take up position with 4, leaving 'a' as a threat for later.




Dia. 16: what Black wants

Dia. 16. Black 2 is also possible, of course. After 5, Black considers that the fighting has come to a pause and uses his valuable sente to switch to a large point elsewhere. Note that it's necessary for White to force with 'a' through 'd', the sooner the better. If Black finds a good opportunity to play the *guzumi* (a good empty triangle) of 'c', White will find this very severe on him.



Dia. 17: White's resistance


Dia. 17. White does have counter-measures available. The diagonal connection of 1 is a subtle move. If Black 2, White forces with 3 and 5. The result is almost identical to *Dia. 16* when White plays 'a-d', with the difference that he has omitted the descent at 'a' in this diagram.



Dia. 18: Black falls into a trap

Dia. 18. This is a variation for 2 in the previous diagram. Playing Black 2 here is feasible. Extending at 3 is the only move. If Black now tries to cut with 4 to 8, he falls into a trap: White captures three stones with 9.


If Black 'a', White 'b' is the tesuji. So how should Black answer White 3?




Dia. 19: probably equal

Dia. 19. Black 3 is the shape move. The continuation to 8 is a one-way street. Evaluating this result is difficult. According to Korean conventional wisdom, it seems that it is considered favourable for White because of his corner profit. The Japanese interpretation would not be the exact opposite, but I'm sure many professionals would consider the result equal because of Black's thickness. This is an interesting example of how the evaluation varies according to the country. Koreans value territory because it is directly linked to the result, while Japanese place importance on thickness.

Dia. 20. No conclusion has yet been reached about the hane of Black 1. If you know a good move, please drop me a line.




Dia. 20: a theme for research




Dia. 21: a plus and a minus

Dia. 21. If White simply plays 1 at 3, Black cuts at 4. If then White 5, Black sets up a ladder with 'a'. The aim of the variation shown here is to avoid that, but it has both an advantage and a drawback. The marked white stone can no longer be caught in a ladder. In a sense, it has escaped. Things will depend on the way the game develops, but Black should have the upper hand in the centre. It would require courage for White to pull out these two stones.



Dia. 22: Black's aim


Dia. 22. Black 2 is a resourceful reply to White 1. When the marked stone was at 'a', Black 'b'-White 'c' was a reasonable continuation after White 7. In this diagram, however, the presence of the marked stone lying in wait for White's sliding move at 'd' means that Black has a more sagacious way of settling the shape.



Dia. 23: a painful way to live

Dia. 23. It won't be effective immediately, but Black 1 and 3 are a satisfying way of settling the shape. In a position in which White can't make an eye in the centre, he will be forced to answer with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'. Having to live like this would be very painful, but if White played 'a' at 'b', the best he would be able to get is a ko after Black 'd'—White 'a'—Black 'e'—White 'f'. Neither White nor Black should forget this sequence.


Well, what do you think? If you master the main points, you can't get an unfavourable result after the side contact play of Black 1 in *Dia. 4*. How about trying it out immediately at your local go club? I guarantee you'll get at least one win.



Ref. Fig. 1


White: Kobayashi Satoru
Black: Ryu Shikun

Ref. Fig. 1. The game above was played about two years ago. The side contact play was already being played then. Up to 9, White plays both in the corner and on the bottom side, so he gets what he wants. If Black wants to avoid this result —



Dia. 1: variation

Dia. 1. Instead of 6 in the game, Black might try attaching at 1 here, but I believe that the result to 9 is painful for Black — what does the reader think?



Ref. Fig. 2

White: Hikosaka Naoto
Black: Ryu Shikun
52nd Honinbo league
(28 October 1996)

Ref. Fig. 2. White 2 was a resolute move. Up to 16, White built a Takemiya-style moyo, but Black's corner profit turned out to be too big. But one mustn't slight this variation. Josekis are always evolving, and one day this sequence may gain citizenship. I hope my readers will aim at making new discoveries, too. And if you find something, please inform me — secretly!

(Kido, September 1998. Translated by John Power.)

